( 1 ) IT is next contended that even assuming that an offence of theft had been committed it does not amount to robbery because the injuries to Narsing and Karansing were inflicted after the completion of theft and not for the purpose of facilitating the commission of the theft. Reliance is placed on Bishambhar Nath v. Emperor A. I. R. 1941 Oudh 476

( 2 ) THEFT amounts to `robbery if in order to the committing of the theft or in committing the theft or in carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft the offender for that end voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint or fear of instant death or of instant hurt or of instant wrongful restraint. Before theft can amount to `robbery the offender must have voluntarily caused or attempted to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint or fear of instant death or of instant hurt or of instant wrongful restraint. The second necessary ingredient is that this must be in order to the committing of the theft or in committing the theft or in carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft. The third necessary ingredient is that the offender must voluntarily cause or attempt to cause to any person hurt etc. for that end that is in order to the committing of the theft or for the purpose of committing theft or for carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft. It is not sufficient that in the transaction of committing theft hurt etc. had been caused. If hurt etc. is caused at the time of the commission of the theft but for an object other than the one referred to in sec. 390 I. P. Code theft would not amount to robbery. It is also not sufficient that hurt had been caused in the course of the same transaction as commission of the theft. The three ingredients mentioned in sec. 390 I. P. Code must always be satisfied before theft can amount to robbery and this has been explained in Bishambhar Nath v. Emperor A. I. R. 1941 Oudh 476 Bishambhar Nath v. Emperor A. I. R. 1941 Oudh 476 in the following words:the words `for that end in sec. 390 clearly mean that the hurt caused by the offender must be with the express object of facilitating the committing of the theft or must be caused while the offender is committing the theft or is carrying away or is attempting to carry away the property obtained by theft. It does not mean that the assault or the hurt must be caused in the same transaction or in the same circumstances.

( 3 ) IN Karuppa Gounden v. Emperor A. I. R. 1918 Madras 321 which followed two Calcutta cases of Otaruddi Manjhi v. Kafiluddi Manjhi 5 C. W. N. 372 and King Emperor v. Mathura Thakur 6 C. W. N. 72 it has been observed at page 824 as follows :now it is our duty to give effect to the words `for that end. It would have been open to the legislature to have used other words which would not raise the difficulty that arises here. The public Prosecutor has been forced to argue that `for that end must be read as meaning `in those circumstances. In my opinion we cannot do that in construing a section in the Penal Code. Undoubtedly words `in those circumstances would widen the application of the section and we are not permitted to do that. The matter has been considered in two judgments of the Calcutta High Court one of which is reported as Otaruddi Manjhi v. Kafiluddi Manjhi 5 C. W. . N. 372. Their Lordships put the question in this way:

( 4 ) IT seems to us that the whole question turns upon the words `for that end. Was any hurt or fear of instant hurt that was caused in the present case caused for the end of the commission of the theft? We think not. It seems to us that whatever violence was used for the purpose of dispossessing the persons who were already in possession of the premises in question and had no relation to the commission of theft although theft was committed at the same time.

( 5 ) THE language used in another case reported as K