( 1 ) THE second contention of Mr. S. N. Patel was founded on the plea of limitation. According to Mr. S. N. Patel the suit as originally filed claimed a decree in favour of the firm of Thakkar Lakhiram Ramji and it was only by the application for leave to amend that a decree in favour of Thakkar Lakhiram Ramji as an individual was sought for the first time against the Harij Village Panchayat. The contention of Mr. S. N. Patel was that on 19/03/1953 when the application for leave to amend the plaint was made the cause of action for refund of (he amount of the deposit was time barred since a period of three years had already elapsed from the date of accrual of the cause of action and that no relief could therefore be granted in favour of Thakkar Lakhiram Ramji as an individual. In my opinion this contention is also without any substance. The cause of action in the suit was for recovery of the amount deposited by Thakkar Lakhiram Ramji with the Harij Municipality as and by way of security for the due performance of the contract. The period of the contract expired on 31/07/1949 and the amount of the deposit therefore became repayable to Thakkar Lakhiram Ramji on 1/08/1949. The suit in so far as the claim of Thakkar Lakhiram Ramji as an individual is concerned must obviously having regard to the provisions of section 22 of the Limitation Act be taken to have been filed on 19/03/1953 i. e. more than three years after the date of accrual of the cause of action. It is therefore clear that if the period of limitation is three years no relief could be granted in favour of Thakkar Lakhiram Ramji as an individual and the suit would have to be dismissed. But it would be otherwise if the period of limitation is six years. The question which therefore arises for consideration is as to which is the article which applies to the claim made in the suit.

( 2 ) MR. S. N. Patel relied on Articles 60 62 and 97 of the Limitation Act. So far as Article 60 is concerned it is obvious that that Article cannot apply for it is only to suits for money deposited under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand that that Article applies. The amount claimed in the suit cannot be said to have been deposited under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand. The amount was in fact deposited as security for due performance of the contract and it was only on the due performance of the contract that the amount became repayable to Thakkar Lakhiram Ramji. The amount was certainly not payable on demand. Article 60 must therefore be left out of consideration. Article 97 is equally inapplicable for by its very language it applies only to suits for money paid upon an existing consideration which afterwards fails. There is no question in the present case of any failure of consideration. I need not therefore discuss any further the applicability of Article 97. The only other Article on which reliance was placed by Mr. S. N. Patel was Article 62 and in support of his contention that this Article applied Mr. S. N. Patel involved the aid of a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Johuri Mahton v. Thakoor Nath Lukee. (I. L. R. 5 Calcutta 830 ). Now Article 62 applies to suits for money payable by the defendant to the plaintiff for money received by the defendant for the plaintiffs use. By reason of the use of this language which is borrowed from English cases the Courts in some cases have been misled into thinking that the cause of action envisaged by Article 62 is that for money had and received as understood in England But as observed by Chagla C. J. in Lingangouda Marigouda v. Lingangouda (LIV Bombay Law Reporter 829) though the language used in this Article is the language taken from English cases. . . . there is one important fact that should be borne in mind that in England it was necessary for the Courts to find an implied contract in order that suits may be maintainable. A suit in personam would not lie unless there was an express