( 1 ) THIS appeal raises some questions relating to the construction of certain provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 1946 The facts giving rise to this appeal are few and for the most part undisputed and may be briefly stated as follows. The first appellants are a limited company carrying on business of manufacturing chemicals at Mithapur in Jamnagar District. The second appellant is the Works Manager of the factory of the first appellants at Mithapur while the third respondent is the Divisional Engineer in charge of the power house of the first appellants. The Respondent was employed as a clerk in the establishment of the first appellants since 23rd May 1950 and at the material time he was drawing a basic salary of Rs. 80/per month plus Dearness Allowance of Rs. 69/per month his total emoluments thus being Rs. 149/per month. The industrial establishment of the first appellants being an industrial establishment to which the Industrial Employment ( Standing Orders ) Act 1946 was applicable Standing Orders amongst others for clerks other than workmen employed by the first appellants were certified by the Commissioner of Labour Bombay and Certifying Officer Bombay under section 5 of the Act. the Standing Orders came into force on 27th February 1957 and applied to all clerks employed in the industrial establishment of the first appellants to do clerical labour but excluding all clerks in the employ of contractors. It was not disputed that the respondent was a person to whom the Standing Orders applied. On or about 13th November 1958 the respondent was dismissed from service on the ground that the respondent had committed acts of major misconduct specified in Clauses 9 17 and 25 of Standing Order No. 31. According to the respondent the first appellants did not comply with the procedure set out in Clause 4 of Standing Order No. 32 before passing the order of dismissal as required by Clause 3 of that Standing Order. The respondent therefore filed a suit against the appellants contending that the respondent was dismissed by the appellants without complying with Standing Order No. 32 and that the dismissal of the respondent was therefore ultra vires and that the respondent consequently continued to be in the employment of the first appellants and was entitled to receive from the first appellants emoluments from 14 November 1958 upto the date of reinstatement. The prayers which he claimed in the suit were: (1) a declaration that the order of dismissal passed by the appellants against the respondent was illegal and ultra vires and the respondent accordingly continued in the employment of the first appellants; and (2) an order for payment of all emoluments from 14 November 1958 upto the date of reinstatement. The suit was resisted by the appellants on various grounds. In this appeal I am concerned only with the grounds which were urged by the appellants as and by way of preliminary objection to the suit and it is therefore not necessary to recapitulate in detail the grounds affecting the merits of the defence. It is sufficient to state that the appellants contended that in dismissing the respondent they had complied with Standing Order No. 32 and that the dismissal of the respondent was therefore not invalid The three main grounds which were urged by way of preliminary objection to the suit were firstly that the suit was barred by the provisions of sec. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure secondly that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to hear the suit in view of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and thirdly that the suit was barred under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act. The first two grounds do not survive for consideration in this appeal since they were negatived by the lower appellate Court and they have not been pressed before me by Mr. I. M. Nanavati learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants. The only ground out of the aforesaid three grounds which was