( 1 ) THIS is defendant-tenants Second Appeal. It arises out of a suit brought by plaintiff-respondent for evicting appellant. Respondent claimed to evict appellant on two grounds:- (1) that appellant was a tenant in arrears and (2) that respondent required the suit premises reasonably and bonafide for his personal use. Appellants defence was that the contracual rent was not the standard rent and that all the arrears of rent had been tendered to respondent prior to the institution of the suit. Appellant also contended that the notice terminating the tenancy was bad. She also denied the allegation of reasonable and bonafide personal requirement. The trial Court held that the contractual rent was the standard rent; that the arrears of rent were tendered by appellant prior to the institution of the suit by a money order and that the money order was refused by respondent. It further held that however appellant had failed to deposit the amount of costs of the suit and had not continued to deposit rent every month after the institution of the suit. This finding was recorded by the trial Court on the misconception that under the Saurashtra Rent Control Act 1951 (hereafter called the Act) the tenant was required to make the latter deposit. The trial Court also held that the notice was valid. It further held that respondent had proved that he required the premises reasonably and bonafide for his personal use. On the aforesaid findings the trial Court decreed the claim of eviction of respondent. Appellant went in appeal to the District Court at Bhavnagar. The learned Extra Assistant Judge of that Court however dismissed the appeal. Though the learned appellate Judge held that contractual rent was the standard rent no finding was recorded by him on the question as to whether on account of the non-payment of the costs and the failure to pay rent every month the decree for eviction should or should not be upheld. On the question of reasonable and bonafide requirement the learned appellate Judge agreed with the finding of the learned trial Judge.

( 2 ) NOW the first point which is urged by Mr. Vyas in support of the appeal is that the judgment of the learned appellate Judge is not in accordance with law and that therefore apart from the merits of the case the appeal deserves to be allowed and that the first appeal preferred by appellant in the District Court should be remanded for recording fresh findings. The contention is based mainly on the provision contained in Order 41 rule 31 Civil Procedure Code 1908 That rule enacts that the judgment of the appellate Court shall inter alia state (1) the points for determination (2) the decision thereon and (3) reasons for the decision. The part of the rule which the learned Judge is alleged to have broken is the direction that reasons must be given for the decision. For the purpose of considering this question I propose to ignore for the present the contention of Mr. Vyas that before the appellate Court the finding of the learned trial Judge that decree for eviction should be passed on the ground that appellant had failed to pay the amount of costs and to deposit the rent every month after the institution of the suit had been challenged and that the learned Judge had not framed any point for determination and that he had not recorded any decision thereon. The contention which I propose to examine in the first instance is the contention that the learned appellate Judge has not given reasons for recording his decision on the question of reasonable and bonafide requirement. It is not disputed that the learned Judge did raise the aforesaid point for determination and has also recorded his decision thereon. Mr. Vyass contention however is that though the aforesaid two requirements of Order 41 rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 have been complied with the learned Judge has committed a breach of the further requirement of recording his reasons for the actual decision that he has