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1965 Supreme(Guj) 8

Gujarat High Court
Judgename :J.B.MEHTA, J.M.SHELAT
MOHMAD ALLABUX BABU KANSARA - Appellant
Versus
STATE - Respondent
S.C.A.33 of 1964
Decided On : 02/03/1965

Advocates Appeared: B.R.SOMPURA, C.T.DAN

Headnote:

Preventive Detention Act – sections 3,7–Detention–No Rational Connection – The petitioner was furnished with the grounds of detention by a communication of the District Magistrate As required by sub-sec. (3) of sec. 3 of the Act the Government of Gujarat gave its approval to the said order the District Magistrate gave the name of the petitioners alleged associate referred of the said grounds and the names of eight of his other alleged associates referred of the said grounds – It would seem that the State Government thereafter referred the matter to the Advisory Board and presumably upon the Advisory Board reporting that there was in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner the State Government by its order confirmed the said order of the District Magistrate – It is the validity of this order which has been challenged in this petition – Held At stage of approval Government would have before it impugned order the grounds on which it is made report of officer and also particulars which have a bearing upon matter – It is well-settled that the particulars mentioned in sec. 2 (3) are not same as those which may be furnished to the detenu under provisions of sec. 7 (1) and Article 22 (5 ) – That distinction between the two types of particulars also shows that the expression the earliest opportunity of making a representation in sec. 7 (1) has nothing to do with the time limit of approval under sec. 33 –The approval of the appropriate Government is provided presumably as a safeguard against arbitrary exercise of power under sec. 3 (2) by an executive officer –That safeguard and the time limit within which the power to approve has to be exercised cannot be mixed up with the time limit provided in sec. 7 (1) of the Act – For these reasons it is not possible to accept the contention that because the particulars regarding the names of the associates of the detained person were given thirteen days after the date of detention and the communication giving those names having been made on after the time limit for approval that communication was in infringement of sec. 7 (1) or Article 23 (5) and cannot therefore be taken into account – Petition Dismissed

J. B. MEHTA, J. M. SHELAT, J.

( 1 ) THIS petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution against an order of detention passed against the petitioner. That order was passed on August 3 1964 by the District Magistrate Ahmedabad under sec. 3 (2) read with sec. 3 (1) (a) (ii) of the Preventive Detention Act IV of 1950. On the same day the District Magistrate passed another order directing that the petitioner should be detained in the Ahmedabad Central Prison and should be treated as a Class II prisoner. The petitioner was furnished with the grounds of detention by a com- munication of the District Magistrate dated August 6 1964 As required by sub-sec. (3) of sec. 3 of the Act the Government of Gujarat gave its approval to the said order on August 11 1964 On August 17 1964 the District Magistrate gave the name of the petitioners alleged associate referred to in para 4 (11) of the said grounds and the names of eight of his other alleged associates referred to in para 4 (13) of the said grounds. It would seem that the State Government thereafter referred the matter to the Advisory Board and presumably upon the Advisory Board report- ing that there was in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner the State Government by its order dated September 28 1964 confirmed the said order of the District Magistrate. It is the validity of this order which has been challenged in this petition.

( 2 ) MR. Daru for the petitioner has urged three contentions before us:- (1) that the grounds on which the order of detention is based have no rational connection with the maintenace of public order and therefore falls outside the scope of sec. 3 read with sec. 7 of the Act; (2) that the grounds furnished to the petitioner are vague and do not indicate the time and place of the alleged incidents and also the names of the Victims and therefore they are not such as would enable the petitioner to effectively exercise his constitutional right of representation. Consequently the continued detention of the petitioner is not in accordance with the procedure established by law and is violative of Article 21; and (3) the communication of the names of the allegd associate of the petitioner by the third respondents letter dated August 17 1964 is a belated one and does not comply with the provisions of Article 22 (5) and sec. 7 (1) of the Act which provides that the grounds should be furnished as soon as may be and not later than five days from the date of detention.

( 3 ) WE had had occasion to consider sec. 3 of the Act its scope and also the meaning and content of the expression maintenance of public order as used in sec. 3 (1) (a) (ii) of the Act in Special Criminal Applica- tions Nos. 30 and 32 of 1954 which we decided on January 28 and 30 1965 respectively (Digvijaysinhji v. H. K. Oza VI G. L. R. 632 ). What we said in those decisions was that sec. 3 provided for detention as a puni- tive measure and that the action was not intended to provide punishment for something which was done by the person concerned but to prevent him or intercept him from doing something which would endanger any one of the objects set out in the section. We also there laid down that the preventive detention so provided for by the section was dependent not on a conviction based on legal evidence but on suspicion or reason- able probability and that that being so action taken under the section was based on the satisfaction of the detaining authority and the standard of conduct failure to conform which would result in detention was not objective but subjective. Therefore it is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that is the condition-precedent for the exercise of power and not any objective test by a Court. Therefore the question regarding satisfaction of the detaining authority is not justiciable nor the sufficiency of the material placed before it nor the question as to their truth or otherwise. But we also said that though the Court cannot go int













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