( 1 ) THIS Second Appeal is directed against the decision dated 10 December 1957 recorded by the learned District Judge Broach in Regular Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1957. The facts necessary to be stated in order to understand the disputes between the parties may be stated at first. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are the sisters of the husband of plaintiff. Plaintiff filed Civil Suit No. 105 of 1954 against defendants Nos. 1 2 and 3 for partition of certain properties mentioned in the plaint of that suit and separate possession of her 1/2 share therein. Defendant No. 3 was joined as a party because defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had mortgaged some of the aforesaid suit properties with him. The suit ended in a compromise and a consent decree of which Ex. 23 is a certified copy was passed on 26 of July 1955. By this decree plaintiff was made the exclusive owner of lot No. B in that suit and defendants No. 1 and 2 were made exclusive owners of lot No. C therein. A latrine which was lot No. D was kept common between the parties. This compromise decree contained the following agreement which plaintiff seeks to enforce specifically in the suit from out of which this Second Appeal arises. The agreement is as follows :-Each party has to sell to the other respective portions of the properties which have come to their share as above at a price fixed by two members of the Panch when either party wants to sell its share. On 17 January 1956 defendants Nos. 1 and 2 sold property comprised in lot No. `c and their share in the property comprised in lot No. D by a sale deed of that date which is Ex. 33 in the case. The sale was made for Rs. 1 800 Plaintiffs case however was that though the sale purported to be for Rs. 1 800 the actual price stipulated and paid was Rs. 1 300 only. Both the lower Courts have found that plaintiff was right in this contention. On 23rd May 1956 plaintiff gave a notice to defendants and called upon them to honour the agreement contained in the aforesaid compromise decree. As defendants No. 3 gave a reply and refused to pass a sale-deed in favour of plaintiff she instituted the suit from out which this Second Appeal arises.

( 2 ) ALL the three defendants resisted the claim on a number of grounds some of them legal and others on merits. The trial Court rejected all the contentions of defendants and decreed the claim for specific performance. Defendants Nos. 1 and 3 preferred the aforesaid appeal to the District Court at Broach but the appeal was dismissed. I am no longer concerned with the dispute between the parties regarding the merits of the case. The present appeal is preferred by defendant No. I alone. Mr. Majmundar the learned counsel for defendant No. 1 attacks the appellate decree on same legal grounds on which the suit was attacked in the two lower Courts and in addition he has raised one or two more points which will be dealt with at their proper place. I propose to take up the contentions raised by Mr. Majmundar one by one.

( 3 ) THE first contention of Mr. Majmundar was that the suit contract was void for uncertainty. The contention which was urged in the first appellate Court was that the suit contract was uncertain in regard to price. The exact price to be paid for the sale of the property has not been mentioned in the agreement. The argument was that the price was an essential term of a contract for sale and the price not having been definitely stated in the agreement the contract was void on the ground that one of the material terms was uncertain. This argument was repelled by the learned District Judge by reference to Illustration (e) to sec. 29 of the Indian Contract Act. That illustration says that if A agrees to sell to B 1000 maunds of rice at a price to be fixed by C there is no uncertainty in the agreement because the price was capable of being made certain. The illustration illustrates the applicability of the second part of sec. 29 which states that agreements which are not capable of being mad