( 1 ) THE facts giving rise to this appeal are quite simple. Soni Bhailal Damji of Bhuj obtained a decree for a sum of Rs. 1329-3-6 together with costs of the suit and future interest against the appellant - defendant in Regular Civil Suit No 8 of 1952 in the Court of the Civil Judge (J. D) at Bhuj. The suit was decided on 31-12-52. A decree in pursuance of the judgment was drawn up and signed by the learned Judge on 2-2-53. The plaintiff-judgment-creditor thereafter filed Darkhast No. 12 of 1956 in the same Court for recovering the amount due under the decree against the defendant-judgment-debtor. That was filed on 27 Before registering the Darkhast the office had raised a point as to how the Darkhast was in time. From the endorsement made on the Darkhast application it appears that after hearing the learned advocate for the judgment-creditor the Darkhast was ordered to be registered. Notice was directed to be issued to the judgment-debtor. The notice had come back unserved as the period for his appearing in the Court was over. On that day it appears that the decree-holder did not prosecute his Darkhast and it came to be disposed off on 21-5-56. Thereafter on 19-3-59 the judgment-creditor filed another Darkhast No. 34 of 1959 for recovering the said amount from the judgment-debtor by attachment and sale of his movable property. The judgment-debtor appeared and resisted the application inter alia contending that since the first Darkhast application filed against him was barred by limitation the subsequent one was not maintainable. The contention raised by the judgment-debtor was that the first Darkhast filed after the period of limitation of three years was over from the date of the decree as required under Art. 182 of the Indian Limitation Act and that therefore it was time-barred and consequently it cannot serve as a step in aid of execution to bring the subsequent Darkhast in time. The learned trial Judge thought that though the limitation runs from the date of the judgment and not from the date of signing the decree but since the date of decree is given as 2-2-53 the period of limitation would begin to run from that date and not from the date of the judgment. He also found that the principle of actus curiae neminum gravabit i. e. act of Court shall prejudice no man would govern the case inasmuch as the judgment-creditor was misled by that date viz. 2-2-53 on the decree and that therefore his filing of the first Darkhast on 27-1-56 was in time. That being so he further found that it was not open to the judgment-debtor to object to the subsequent application for execution on the ground that the previous application was barred by time the matter being res judicata. He therefore rejected the contentions raised by the judgment-debtor and directed the Darkhast to proceed further.

( 2 ) FEELING dissatisfied with that order passed on 27-11-59 by Mr. B. J. Shelat Joint Civil Judge Bhuj the defendant-judgment-debtor preferred Regular Civil Appeal No. 24 of 1960 in the Court of the District Judge Kutch at Bhuj. The only point before that Court was as to from what date the period contemplated under Art. 182 of the Indian Limitation Act would commence and in his view since the decree was drawn up and signed on 2-2-53 the period of limitation would begin to run from that date and not from the date of the decree as it should be viz. the date of judgment which was 31-12-52. It may be stated here that on the material before us it appears that the decree was drawn and signed on 2-2-53 and not on 31-1-53. In the result therefore he dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order passed by the learned trial Judge. Aggrieved by that decision passed on 9th January 1961 by Mr. V. M. Solanki District Judge Kutch at Bhuj the judgment-debtor has come in appeal before this Court.

( 3 ) THE contention made out by Mr. K. N. Mankad the learned advocate for the appellant was that both the Courts have ignored the material fact about the decr