( 1 ) THE plaintiff is the daughter of one Manibai who was the widow of one Gopalji. Gopalji was a member of the joint Hindu family of Narsidas Dahyabhai of which the original defendant No. 1 (by his heirs after his death) and the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were also the members. The plaintiff alleged that the suit properties viz. two houses situate in the city of Bhavnagar were the Joint family properties and that she was entitled to a share therein on partition of the said properties and to the possession of her share in them.

( 2 ) THERE is no dispute about certain facts. Gopalji father of the plaintiff died in 1902 A. D. leaving Manibai as his widow. Manibai was alive in 1956 when the Hindu Succession Act came into force. She died in or about 1958. The plaintiff is the daughter of Gopalji and Manibai and claims through Manibai.

( 3 ) THE defendants resisted the suit principally on two grounds. Their first contention was that the suit properties were not joint and that Manibai had not been in possession of the suit properties in her own right.

( 4 ) THE learned Trial Judge upon evidence held that property A mentioned in the schedule to the plaint was joint and that property B was not joint family property. He also held that Manibai had not been in possession in her own right but that she was permitted to occupy the first floor of property A because she had the right of residence. In that view of the matter the learned Trial Judge dismissed the suit.

( 5 ) THE plaintiff appealed to the District Court.

( 6 ) THE learned Assistant Judge held that both the properties were not joint and that Manibai had not been in possession of the suit properties in her own right. Therefore no benefit of sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act was available to Manibai and that therefore it was not available to the plaintiff. In that view of the matter the learned Assistant Judge dismissed the appeal.

( 7 ) IT is against that appellate Judgment and decree that the plaintiff has filed the present Second Appeal.

( 8 ) THE first question which Mr. S. M. Shah has canvassed before me is that the suit properties are joint family properties. Whether the suit properties are joint family properties or not appears to be a question of fact and if I was required to go into the evidence and to reappreciate it in order to arrive at a different finding I would not have done so. Mr. Shah however has rested content with inviting my attention to Ex. 10 which is a letter which the defendants attorney wrote to the plaintiffs attorney on 12th August 1938. This letter has been referred to by the learned Assistant Judge and in his view it does not contain an admission on the part of the defendants that the suit properties were joint family properties. In my opinion the learned Assistant Judge has misread that letter. I reproduce from the said letter the following extract which shows that the defendants have admitted that the suit properties were joint family properties. It is absolutely false that save and except the two houses one of which is in collapsed condition there is any other property belonging to joint family. It is true that your client is a daughter of Manibai but she is not in any way interested in the ancestral property. The exception contained in the said extract read in context of the entire statement makes it clear that the defendants had been telling the plaintiff that except the two properties which indisputably were the suit properties there were no other joint family properties. However the learned Assistant Judge has upon appreciation of evidence held that property B has been the exclusive property of Pragji Dipchand and that it does not belong to the joint family of Narshibhai Dahyabhai. Even though something different has been stated by the defendants in the letter Ex. 10 the learned Assistant Judge after having taken into account several overall circumstances has recorded this finding. It is a finding of fact and it belongs to the rea