( 1 ) 6 It will be worthwhile to consider the civil application No. 1328 of 1971 given by the appellants before dealing with the question on merits. According to the appellants except respondent No. 3 and the members of his family other respondents had not come to India until now. It is also stated that all the respondents except respondent No. 3 have accepted the citizenship of Africa and they are already settled there. It was further urged that the respondents had kept two flats in Bombay which were lying vacant and therefore they did not require the suit premises at Visavadar. The pertinent question which arises for my consideration is whether sitting in a second appeal it would be open to me to take into consideration the subsequent development which has taken place after the decree was passed by the first appellate court. I entirely agree with the learned advocate for the respondents that by considering this application virtually I would permit the appellants to lead additional evidence before this court which is not permissible in a second appeal. In second appeal No. 756 of 1960 with civil applications Nos. 184a/1960 1258 and 1259/1964 decided on 17/23/24-2-1965 (State of Bombay v. Vora Ibrahim Akbarali) Divan J. after taking into consideration several decisions of the Bombay Calcutta and Madras High Courts observedi respectfully agree with the observations of the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court. In the instant case also the additional evidence which the plaintiff respondent in this second appeal wants to lead before this court has come into existence after the disposal of the first appeal by the learned District Judge Baroda and during the pendency of the present second appeal. However in the light of this additional evidence the original plaintiff wants me to decide a question of fact. The only ground of attacking the judgment or decree of the lower appellate court can be one of the grounds set out in sec. 100 C. P. C. and the only manner of supporting that judgment and decree can be that none of the defects set out in sec. 100 of the C. P. C. is attracted so far as the present case is concerned. In view of this judgment of the Calcutta High Court I have come to the conclusion that this civil application for leading additional evidence cannot be allowed. It was further observedit was in the alternative urged before me on behalf of the petitioner in this civil application that if there is no power under the provisions of order 41 rule 27 and sec. 100 of the C. P. C. the High Court should exercise the inherent powers under sec. 151 of the C. P. C. and allow such additional evidence to be led. Now this argument is not tenable because it is well settled law that where there is a specific provision made by the Legislature on any particular point the provisions of sec. 151 C. P C. cannot be invoked and if the Legislature in terms laid down in sec. 100 to 103 of the C. P. C. that the High Court can entertain second appeal only on points of law as mentioned in those sections and that the final court for the purposes of facts is the first appellate court it is clear that the provisions of sec. 151 of the C. P. C. and the inherent powers of the High Court cannot help the original plaintiff in leading additional evidence at the stage of second appeal. I must come to my conclusions on points of law on the facts as found by the first appellate court and it is not open to admit additional evidence and the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of the C. P. C. cannot apply so far as this second appeal is concernedfurther relying on the observations made in the case of Ramchandra v. Krishnaji I. L. R. XXVlli Bombay 4 wherein it was observed thatwhen on coming to the High Court under second appeal it is discovered that there is evidence which ought to have been placed before the lower courts the proper practice to pursue is to allow the second appeal to be withdrawn in order that a review petition may be presented to t