( 1 ) THE petitioner member society and its manager challenge in this petition the order passed by respondent No. 2 District Registrar under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Act referring the dispute between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 federal society as per the order at Annexure A dated June 9 1969 to the nominee respondent No. 3 for resolution of that dispute. The petitioner has challenged this order on three grounds:- (1) That sec. 96 of the Act providing for the statutory arbitration is ultra vires (2) That in any event the District Registrar having not given a reasoned order the impugned order is void order and (3) that as respondent No. 2 was an ex-officio director of the federal society he could not have remained indifferent and situated as he was there was a conflict of interest and duty and therefore such a biased person was disqualified from deciding this preliminary question under sec. 96 (2) of the Act.

( 2 ) AS regards the first question the point is now concluded by the decision of the Division Bench consisting of the learned Chief Justice and D. A. Desai J. in Rasiklal v. Kailasgavri XII G. L. R. 355. The learned Chief Justice speaking for the Division Bench in terms held that the provision of the special machinery of adjudication of their disputes by a domestic forum was justified having regard to the object of the impugned provisions in sections 96 and 98 of the Act. So also the said procedure was justified in its application to other class namely non-members who unlike members officers and servants are outsiders qua the society but the classification made by the Legislature in regard to non-members suffered from a serious infirmity and that infirmity invalidated the classification. Therefore only qua non-members the impugned sec. 96 was held to be ultra vires and void as offending Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore so far as the petitioner society is concerned and the respondent No. 1 federal society the aforesaid section was clearly intra vires as it provided an adjudication machinery for disputes between the society and its members by domestic forum. That is why the first question was completely concluded so far as this Court is concerned.

( 3 ) AS regards the other two questions the argument has been advanced on the ground that the aforesaid order of the District Registrar was a quasi-judicial order and therefore it must be a speaking order and must be passed by the authority who is not disqualified being a biased authority.

( 4 ) WE need not go into the earlier decision because at one stage it was thought that there was a difference between a duty to act fairly and a duty to act judicially because of the decision in Nakkuda Alis case and therefore where an administrative authority had a mere duty to act fairly as distinguished from a duty to act judicially the order was not reviewed by the process of judicial review in a writ of certiorari. Nakkuda Alis decision got shattered by the observations of Lord Reid in his classic decision in Ridge v. Baldwin (1964 0 AC 40) where the learned Judge pointed out the wrong gloss which was put on Hemart C. J. s observations by requiring the characteristic of a duty to decide judicially being shown to be superadded and by pointing out the error which was committed by their Lordships of the Privy Council. That is why our Supreme Court in Rampur Distillery and Chemical Co. v. Company Law Board A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 1789 at page 1794 in terms pointed out that Nakkuda Alis case (1951 AC 66) was in their Lordships view erroneously decided where it laid down that a duty to act judicially arose only from an express provision to that effect. Their Lordships in terms followed the view taken by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin (1964 0 AC 40) and also in the later decision in Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture Fisheries and Food 1968 1 A. E. R. 694 which is another land-mark in the modern administrative law. Ther