1974 Supreme(Guj) 95
Gujarat High Court
Judgename :J.B.MEHTA, P.D.DESAI
KISHANCHAND WADHUMAL - Appellant
Versus
K.M.SATWANI,motor ACCIDENT CLAIMS TRIBUNAL,ahmedabad (RURAL) - Respondent
S.C.A. 1318 of 1974
Decided On : 09/03/1974
Headnote:
Constitution of India, Art. 226 – Accident claim – Compensation - Whether there is any condition precedent created by the Act or the relevant rules that no such award shall be drawn up until the deficit Court-fee is first paid up by the claimants – Held, court-fee amount is properly paid up by the person on whom the liability is fastened ultimately the Claims Tribunal could surely incorporate the necessary direction in its judgment and award. If the certifying power can be subsequently exercised under sec. 110e on an application made by the person entitled it is obvious that in case of such a court-fee claim due to the State under the award such a direction could be incorporated in the award itself. What can be done on a motion by an application can be done in this context suo motu by the Court for safeguarding court fee claim by or as per direction in the award itself. That would bring the scheme of this Act in line with sec. 13 (1) of the Court fees Act as per the obvious intention of the legislature when it relaxed court fees provision in case of in fated claimants involved in such motor accidents - Petition allowed.
( 1 ) THIS petition has been filed by the original claimants in M. A. C. T. Application before respondent No. 1 Claims Tribunal. The claimants son had been knocked down by respondent No. 3 A. M. T. S. driver. The compensation which was claimed in the petition was of a sum of Rs. 9999. 00. The judgment of the Tribunal resulted in the following order dated January 11 1974 :- the opponent shall pay to the applicants a sum of Rs. 7500/ with interest from the date of application till payment at 6% per annum and costs of the application. The opponents shall bear own costs. An award shall be drawn upon the deficit Court-fees being paid. After this judgment the claimants moved the Tribunal by an application dated April 18 1974 requesting the Tribunal to perform its duty to draw up the award and to pass suitable directions so that the amount of the award can be recovered from respondents Nos. 2 and 3 the driver and the Corporation. It was also pointed out by the claimants that as the judgment had directed respondents Nos. 2 to 3 to pay all the costs the amount should be realised from them as the claimant No. 1 the father was only getting a pay of Rs. 15t per month and had no means to pay the deficit court-fee stamp of Rs. 550/and could not arrange any loan. The Tribunal however refused to draw up the award or to take any step for recovery of the amount awarded on the sole ground that unless the court-fee amount was paid no such award could be drawn up. The claimants have therefore filed this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
( 2 ) IN a series of decisions of this Court the Claims Tribunal when it deals with such compensation matters has been held to be a Court because the Claims Tribunal is constituted in super session of the ordinary Courts of the land for this purpose with all the powers of the Court and it has to pronounce a definitive judgment in accordance with law after proper evidence is led for fastening the liability on the basis of fault. After considering the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act as a Single Judge I had decided this question on settled principles in Special C. A. No. 1599 of 1969 decided on July 23 1970 and that view was approved in the decision of the Division Bench where Patel J. spoke for the Division Bench for both of us in F. A. No. 280 of 1968 decided on November 15 1971 Even the relevant Bombay Motor Vehicle Rules 1959 hereinafter referred to as the Rules make a clear provision in rule 306 for a judgment of the Claims Tribunal by enacting that the Claims Tribunal in passing orders shall record concisely in a judgment the finding on each of the issues framed and its reasons for such finding. Therefore it is obvious that in such Motor Accident Claims proceedings which result in an award of compensation under sec. 110 the Claims Tribunal has to pass a formal judgment in accordance with which a formal award or decree has to be drawn up as required by the provisions of the Code. The Claims Tribunal being a Court would be governed by the provisions of the Code in that respect. That is why rule 310 even enacts that in so far as these rules make no provision or make insufficient provisions the Claims Tribunal shall follow the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for the trial of suits. It is against such an award of the Claims Tribunal under sec. 110b that an appeal is provided to this Court under sec. 110d. Rule 312 (3) provides that the provisions of Order 41 and Order 21 in the Code shall mutatis mutandis apply to appeals preferred to the High Court under sec. 110 Therefore there is not only a judgment and formally drawn up award against which an appeal had to be filed but the original decree or the decree in appeal could be executed by invoking the provisions under Order 21 of the Code. Even so far as the insurer is concerned sec. 96 (1) has therefore provided that if after a certificate of insurance has been issued under sec. 95 (4) in favour of th