( 1 ) IF the lower judiciary were to make an approach which has been made by the learned District Judge Bhavnagar the ends of substantial justice are not likely to prevail in the life time of the present generation. This gloomy prognosis of darkness and despair is provoked by the circumstance that the learned District Judge Bhavnagar has refused to condone a delay of mere five days occasioned on account of the death of the petitioners child. In Ramlal and others v. Rewa Coalfields A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 361 and the State of West Bengal v. The Administrator Howrah Municipality and others A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 749 the Supreme Court has emphasised the need for interpreting the in expression sufficient cause employed in sec. S of the limitation Act in a liberal manner so as to advance the cause of substantial justice particularly when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. The learned District Judge Bhavnagar has exhibited a total Unawareness about the cause of substantial justice and has refused to condone a delay of a short period of five days even in the face of the fact that death had stalked into the home of the poor petitioner and snatched away his child. With tears welling up in the eyes no one with human feelings would think of appeals and law Courts.

( 2 ) EXAMINING the matter on principle when the Court is confronted with the question of condoning delay the mental radar must flash the following messages :-1 Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2 Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3 Every days delay must be condoned does not mean that a pedantic unpragmatic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4 When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5 There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides. The presumption would be just the other way round. 6 It is unreasonable to adopt the approach of a school master using his rod to discipline the student. One need not bond backwards in such matters. The attitude must be one informed with greatest awareness for the cause of justice. 7 It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but Because it is capable of removing injustice and expected to do so.

( 3 ) TURNING now to the facts the petitioner is a poor peon employed in the Municipality of Bhavnagar. A decree for eviction against him was passed by the trial Court on January 31 1974 He applied for certified copies of the judgment and decree on February 18 1974 The copies were ready for delivery on March 16 1974 The appeal against the decree for eviction ought to have been presented by him latest on March 29 19749 which was the last day of limitation taking into account the time required for obtaining the certified copies of the judgment and decree. Unfortunately a 1 1/2 years old child of the petitioner died on March 27 1974 two days before the last day for filing the appeal. Under the circumstances the appeal was lodged on April 5 1974 instead of March 29 1974 Thus there was a delay of five days taking into account the fact that March 31 1974 and April 1 1974 were holidays. In order to explain the delay the petitioner filed an affidavit accompanied by the death certificate of his child and prayed for condonation of delay. It was stated by the petitioner in the a