A. N. SURTI, M. P. THAKKAR, J.

( 1 ) A question of considerable importance is raised in the present writ petition affecting the representation of parties as provided in sub-sec. (4) of sec. 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act 9147 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes before a Tribunal appointed by the State Government under Clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 10 of the Act and the alleged claim of the members of the legal profession of their right to practice before any Tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence as provided under sec. 30 (ii) of the Advocates Act 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Advocates Act ).

( 2 ) IN order to appreciate the central issue of dispute between the parties a few relevant facts may be stated.

( 3 ) ON November 23 1974 the Government of Gujarat appointed respondent No. 2 (Shri M. U. Shah) Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat at Ahmedabad as the Tribunal for adjudication of an industrial dispute connected with the matters specified in the schedule appended to the order at Annexure A to the petition. The said dispute existed between the Jyoti Switchgears Limited Mogar district Kaira and the workmen employed under it. The Schedule which is set out at the foot of Annexure A to the petition is as follows : 1 All workmen working in the factory should be given following leave with full pay: (a) 15 days sick leave. (b) 15 days casual leave. (c) 10 days festival leave. 2 Sick leave and privilege leave should be allowed to be accumulated upto 3 years. 9

( 4 ) THE aforesaid reference before the Tribunal was numbered as Reference: I. T. No. 212/74. In the said reference respondent No. I Kheda Jilla Factory Kamdar Union appeared on behalf of the petitioner Companys workmen and objected to the appearance of the petitioner Companys advocate.

( 5 ) THE petitioner-Company submitted before the Tribunal that the aforesaid objection of the Union was not valid in law and not tenable. On behalf of the petitionercompany it was submitted that sec. 36 of the Act places partial restriction on the partys right for being represented by a legal practitioner. It was also urged on behalf of the petitioner-Company that it was open to the parties to be represented by legal practitioners having obtained the consent of the other parties as mentioned in sec. 36 (4) of the Act. It was also urged on behalf of the petitionercompany that the provisions contained in sec. 36 of the Act have been rendered ineffective and are superseded by subsequent legislation namely the Advocates Act. It was also urged on behalf of the petitioner-Company before the Tribunal that see. 31) of the Advocates Act confers a right on an advocate to practice throughout the territory to which the said Act extends and in all Courts and before any Tribunal etc.

( 6 ) THE Tribunal by the impugned order passed on July 1 1975 (vide Annexure C to the petition) rejected the submissions of the petitioner-company after hearing the Personal Officer of the petitioner company. The Tribunal took the view that sec. 36 (3) (4) of the Act does not permit of the appearance of a legal practitioner except with the consent of the other party. As a result of the said view of the Tribunal the Tribunal rejected the application of the petitioners Company for the necessary permission for the oppearance of an advocate before the Tribunal.

( 7 ) UNDER the aforesaid circumstances the petitioner-Company and Mr. Ashvin P. Hathi a practising advocate at Baroda filed the present writ petition in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against Kaira Jilla Factory Kamdar Union who represented the workmen of the petitioner-Company and Shri M. U. Shah who was appointed as the Tribunal for adjudicating the aforesaid dispute between the workmen of the petitioner-Company and the petitionercompany under Clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 10 of the Act.

( 8 ) IN substance it is averred in the petition that there existed a

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