( 1 ) * * * *

( 2 ) AS regards the first contention the provisions of sec. 150 (9) of the Act (Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act) confers power on the Tribunal to call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which an appeal lies to it. . . . . . It is not in dispute before this Court that the words in which an appeal lies to it are descriptive of the proceedings whose record the Tribunal is empowered to Court and examine. Now the proceeding which went to the Tribunal in revision in the present case was a proceeding under sec. 97 (3) of the Act. As stated earlier the matter was already referred to the arbitrator and was pending; and in the meanwhile on December 22 1969 the application for condonation of delay was given to the Registrar under sec. 97 (3 ). The question which arose for determination in this proceeding was whether the Registrar was right an admitting the dispute after expiry of the period on limitation because the applicant satisfied him that the applicant had sufficient ground for not referring the dispute within the prescribed period. The enquiry in such a proceeding is limited to the satisfaction of the Registrar on the question whether the applicant had sufficient cause for not referring the dispute within the prescribed period. If the Registrar is satisfied he would pass an order admitting the dispute even though the prescribed period has experiod; if he is not satisfied he would reject the application. The question is whether an appeal would lie to the Tribunal against such an order; and the answer to this question is obvious. There is no provision in the Act conferring a right of appeal against a decision of the Registrar under sec. 97 (3) on the aggrieved party. The provision of the Act conferring a right of appeal under sec. 153 does not include an order under sec. 97 (3 ). A faint attempt was however made on behalf of the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 to spell out a right of appeal to the Tribunal against an order under sec. 97 (3) by reference to sec. 101 of the Act. That section provides for making of an award on the dispute referred to the Registrar and the award can be made by the Registrar or his nominee or the Board of Nominees. Similarly that provision also empowers the Registrar his nominee or board of nominees to make an award on the expenses incurred by the parties to the dispute in connection with the proceeding and the fees and expenses payable to the Registrar or his nominee or as the case may be board of nominees. It is quite clear that sec. 101 provides for making of an award in a dispute which is admitted to arbitration under sec. 96 of the Act. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that the dispute as to whether there was sufficient cause for not making an application for reference to the Registrar under sec. 97 within the prescribed period would be a dispute falling under sec. 96 of the Act. Therefore reference to sec. 101 is altogether irrelevant. No other provision was pointed out showing that against an order made under sec. 97 (3) an appeal would lie to the Tribunal The power of revision conferred on the Tribunal under sec. 150 (9) is limited to the proceedings in which an appeal lies to it. That condition being absent in the present case it is clear that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain a revisional application and pass the impugned order whereby the order of the Registrar condoning delay was set aside and the dispute raised by the petitioners was held to be timebarred.

( 3 ) THE next question is whether the petitioners should be given the reliefs to the extent claimed by them in the petition so that two types of disputes referred to arbitration should go on. It may be recalled at this stage that mainly two disputes were raised in the present case viz. (1) dispute challenging the expulsion of the deceased father of the petitioners from membership of the society and (2) in the alternative claim for refund of certain amounts paid by the decea