( 1 ) * * * *

( 2 ) MR. Mehta then raised for the first time before us the contention that because of sec 16 of the Gujarat Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act 1972 which came on the statute book during the pendency of the appeal before the learned Single Judge the civil jurisdiction of the courts was taken away. Mr. Mehta urged that sec. 16 unequivocally took away the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of the eviction of any person on the ground that he is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises. Mr. Mehta urged that this sec. 16 was retrospective in operation. We do not agree. There is nothing in the text of sec. 16 of the Act to show that the Act is made retrospective in operation. There are two presumptions of law which operate against the submission of Mr. Mehta. Ordinarily an Act is to be held as prospective in operation and the second dictum of law is that the jurisdiction of an ordinary court is not to be assumed to be ousted or taken away unless there are clean-cut provisions leading to one and only one conclusion either expressly or by necessary implication. The Acts are not to be held retrospective in operation and the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil courts is not to be readily held as ousted.

( 3 ) MR. Mehta in this connection urged that the term entertain is wide enough to cover the dealing with a matter and is not confined to the initiation of the suit and in support of his submission he invited our attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Punni Sabu A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 1384. The word enter- tain occurring in a proviso of Order 21 Rule 90 of the Civil Procedure Code as applicable to the State of Uttar Pradesh came to be interpreted by the Supreme Court. In the peculiar set up of the proviso the Supreme Court held that the word entertain there did not necessarily refer to only initiation of proceedings but was large enough to indicate adjudicate upon or to proceed to consider on merits. The right to sue that had accrued to the Corporation under the normal law of the land cannot be said to have been taken away by the interjection of the above-mentioned Gujarat Act. That right continues to be operative till the matter is finally adjudi- cated upon. For want of any provision in the Act suggesting this rigorous inference we are not inclined to agree with the submission of Mr. Mehta. Appeal dismissed.

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