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1977 Supreme(Guj) 102

Gujarat High Court
Judgename :B.K.MEHTA
SHANABHAI MATHURBHAI PATEL - Appellant
Versus
M.A.PANCHAL - Respondent
APPEAL FROM ORDER 265 of 1977
Decided On : 12/02/1977

Advocates Appeared: G.N.DESAI, M.I.HAVA, R.MANSURI

Headnote:

Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act 1949 – Sections 481,179 – Civil Procedure Code – Order 40 Rule 1 –Transport Service, Prosecute Suit –Transport Manager of Municipal Transport Service and Chairman of Managing Committee of said Transport Service against appellant-defendant for rent of premises let out to him by Corporation has not incompetent for want of prior approval from Corporation before filing the suit –Appellant-defendant has joined issue in suit contending inter alia that authority can institute or prosecute suit only after obtaining approval of Standing Committee and since this was not obtained here prior to filing of suit the suit was not maintainable – Held, interpretation which is sought to be advanced on behalf of appellant that approval is a condition precedent to filing of suit is not borne out on plain reading of the relevant clause –Interpretation if accepted would read more than what Legislature has prescribed since approval can be prior approval or post-facto approval and there is no warrant either explicit or inherent in structure of section to agree with appellant that this approval should be as a matter of fact prior to filing of suit and therefore a condition precedent –Appeal dismissed

B. K. MEHTA, J.

( 1 ) THE original defendant by this appeal challenges the order of City Civil Judge 4 Court Ahmedabad of July 16 1977 holding that the suit filed by the respondents who respectively were the Transport Manager of the Ahmedabad Municipal Transport Service and the Chairman of the Managing Committee of the said Transport Service against the appellant-defendant for rent of the premises let out to him by the Corporation has not incompetent for want of prior approval from the Corporation before filing the suit. The appellant-defendant has joined the issue in the suit contending inter alia that under sec. 481 (1) (h) (i) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act 1949 the authority can institute or prosecute suit only after obtaining the approval of the Standing Committee and since this was not obtained here prior to the filing of the suit the suit was not maintainable.

( 2 ) THE above contention of the appellant-defendant did not find favour with the learned City Civil Judge who on consideration of the meaning of word approval in the relevant Clause of sec. 481 and also on some authorities held that this approval can be also post-facto.

( 3 ) I do not think that there are any justifying reasons for me to interfere with the order of the learned City Civil Judge on this preliminary issue in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in DR. SAILENDRANATH SINHA AND ANOTHER V. JASODA DULAL ADHIKARY AND ANOTHER A. I. R 1959 S. C. 51 where a question arose under the Companies Act 1913 in the context of the powers of the Liquidator to institute or defend proceedings with the sanction of Court under sec. 179 thereof. The Supreme Court in that case held that sec. 179 deals with the powers of Liquidator to institute or defend proceedings with the sanction of Court. But if the Liquidator takes action without the direction of the Court the action would not be illegal or invalid nor would it invalidate prosecution. Justice Kapur speaking for the Court referred with approval to the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in JASWANTRAI MANILAL V. STATE OF BOMBAY A. I. R. 1956 S. C. 575 where it was held as under: "in terms the section lays down the powers of the official liquidator. Such a liquidator has to function under the directions of the Court which is in charge of the liquidation proceedings. One of his powers is to institute prosecutions in the name and on behalf of the company under liquidation with the sanction of the Court. This section does not purport to impose any limitations on the powers of a criminal court to entertain a criminal prosecution launched in the ordinary course under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure". Justice Kapur after referring with approval this passage from Jaswantrai Manilals case (supra) proceeded further to observe as under:"it was also pointed out in this judgment that sec. 179 contains no words corresponding to the language of Drug Control Order 1943 which was held to be a condition precedent for instituting prosecution in the case of BASDEO AGARWALLA V. EMPEROR 1945 FCR 93: (A. I. R. 1945 FC 16) (H) nor are there any prohibitory words like those that are contained in secs. 196 and 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In the former case no prosecution could be instituted without the previous sanction of the Provincial Government and the latter provides that no court shall take cognizance. . . . . . . . . . . There are two cases decided by two Indian High Courts which support the submission of the respondents counsel". The Supreme Court thereafter approved the decision of Allahabad High Court in EMPEROR V. BISHAN SAHAI A. I. R. 1937 ALL. 714 AND MRITYUNJOY CHAKRAVARTI V. PROVAT KUMAR PAL A. I. R 1953 CAL. 153.

( 4 ) RECENTLY in Civil Appeal No. 2224 of 1977 decided on 29th September 1977 in the matter of EVEREST COAL COMPANY (P) LTD. V. STATE OF BIHAR and OTHERS A. I. R. 1977 S. C. 2304 the Supreme Court held that leave granted post-facto by the Court for prosecuting suit aga





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