( 1 ) THESE two revision applications respectively by the original defendant No. 4 and by the original defendants Nos. 1 and 3 are directed against the order of the executing court in the Special Darkhast No. 61 of 1971 pending in the court of the Civil Judge (S. D Surat. The challenge is laid against the acceptance of the bid at the court auction the auction purchaser being the respondent No. 2 Hitendrakumar Jashwantlal Jariwala. The objection to the auction sale is based on the alleged irregularities and illegalities alleged to have been committed in the matter of conducting the auction sale.

( 2 ) ). In the latter of the two revision applications Mr. Sanjanwala has raised one neat question of law by recourse to Order 21 Rule 86 of the Civil Procedure Code. His submission is that after deposited 25% of the purchase price spontaneously the auction purchaser had failed to deposit the remainder of 75% within 15 days of the date of acceptance of the bid and this having been not done that by itself vitiated the entire proceedings and nothing further remained to be done in the matter.

( 3 ) ). As far as the objections on the merits or the procedural aspect of the auction are concerned this High Court exercising its revisional jurisdiction under sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code would be loath to entertain them particularly when the objectionists had an opportunity to ventilate the grievances by having recourse to Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code. On this ground I refuse to go into those questions though they were vigorously sought to be urged before me by Mr. R. A. Mehta for the petitioner of the first of the two revision applications. I make it clear that if it is legally possible for the objectionists now to regitate that question they may do so and I am not to be understood to have expressed any opinion in that regard here one way or the other. The question of delay can be sought to be thrashed out by recourse to sec. 14 of the Indian Limitation Act and the objectionists may invoke this provision and the executing court will consider it on its own merit.

( 4 ) ). Coming to the main point about non-deposit of 75% of the remaining amount of sale consideration Mr. Sanjanwala whose arguments were adopted by Mr. R. A. Mehta urged that provisions of Order 21 Rules 85 and 86 which are reproduced below provide for no extension. The provisions are :"time for payment in full of purchase money 85. The full amount of purchase money payable shall be paid by the purchaser into court before the court closes on the fifteenth day from the sale of the property Provided that in calculating the amount to be so paid into court the purchaser shall have the advantage of any setoff to which he may be entitledd under Rule 72. Procedure in default of payment. 86. In default of payment within the period mentioned in the last preceding rule the deposit may if the court thinks fit after defraying the expenses of the sale be forfeited to the Govt. and the property shall be resold and the defaulting purchaser shall forfeit all claim to the property or to any part of the sum for which it may subsequently be said. " The learned Advocates M/s. Sanjanwala and Mehta submitted that the action purchaser had made default of payment within those 15 days mentioned in Rule 85 and so there was no alternative for the court but to order resale of the property. In this connection heavy reliance was placed by Mr. Sanjanwala on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of MANILAL MOHANLAL SHAH and ORS. V SARDAR SAYED AHMED A. I. R 1954 S. C. 349. In paragraph 8 of the said judgment the Supreme Court has categorically ruled that the provision regarding the deposit of 25 by the purchaser other than the decree holder is mandatory as the language of the rule suggests. The full amount of purchase money must be paid within fifteen days from the date of the sale put the decree holder is entitled to the advantage of a setoff. . . . If the payment is not made within