1983 Supreme(Guj) 13
Gujarat High Court
Judgename :N.H.BHATT
PRABHUDAS KALYANJI - Appellant
Versus
HAJI HASAN HAJI YUSUF MAKLAI - Respondent
SECOND APPEAL 489 of 1979
Decided On : 01/21/1983
Headnote:
Bombay District Municipal Act – Section 2 80 50 and 122 - Suit against the Municipality stating that it had no right to let out the public street - Public street land - Power of Municipality - This brings me to second important question in this second - Important question in this appeal is whether municipality has got any powers to let out public street land - As noted above the plaintiff asserted in plaint that it was never lawful for municipality to let out public street land whereas defendants on other hand contended that defendant could So first question to be decided by me is whether there is an absolute ban on the letting out of this street land - Extreme proposition put forward by plaintiff is difficult to be sustained in view of legal position though it is to be conceded forthwith that under section 80 of Act all property specified in various clauses of sub-section (2) which includes all public streets and pavements which are vested in and belong to municipality are to be held by municipality and applied by municipality as a trustee subject to provisions and for purposes of this Act - This means that ordinarily public streets are to be used by municipality as public streets and public streets – Held, Was alleged that suit was barred by section 252 and 253 of Gujarat Municipalities Act - Alleged nuisance is a continuing cause of action and action is held by me absolutely ultra virus powers of Municipality - Alleged nuisance is a continuing cause of action and action is held by me absolutely ultra virus powers of Municipality. Therefore in facts and circumstances of this case no notice was required to be given provisions of section 252 and 253 of Act are not attracted - Appeals dismissed.
( 1 ) (THE plaintiffs had a land of about 2 feet wide near his compound wall which he had got from the ruler by a Sanad Municipality letting out cabins on footpath near that open land. Plaintiff filed a suit against the Municipality stating that it had no right to let out the public street. His Lordship after narrating facts dealt with the above first point of granting lease and refused to reopen the finding of fact. His Lordship further observed:)
( 2 ) THIS brings me to the second important question arisings in this second appeal. The important question in this appeal is whether the municipality has got any powers to let out the public street land. As noted above the plaintiff asserted in the plaint that it was never lawful for the municipality to let out the public street land whereas the defendants on the other hand contended that the defendant No. 1 could So the first question to be decided by me is whether there is an absolute ban on the letting out of this street land. The extreme proposition put forward by the plaintiff is difficult to be sustained in view of the legal position though it is to be conceded forthwith that under sec. 80 of the Act all property specified in various clauses of sub-sec. (2) which includes all public streets and pavements which are vested in and belong to the municipality are to be held by the municipality and applied by the municipality as a trustee subject to the provisions and for the purposes of this Act. This means that ordinarily public streets are to be used by the municipality as public streets and public streets sa the definition of the term public street in sec. 2 (22) indicates are meant for the publics right of way. So ordinarily such street lands are to be used by the municipality as street lands. In the case of EMPEROR V. VISHWANATH NANA PARPE and OTHERS A. I. R. 1926 BOMBAY 535 the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court whose judgment is the law for this court has held as follows:" Therefore a strong presumption arises that the legislature did not intend by the general power it gives to the municipality to discontinue or stop up public streets that they should use that power for a purpose which contravenes the intention shown by sec. 122 of the Bombay District Municipal Act. " No doubt before the Bombay High Court sec. 50 of the District Municipal Act 1901 was a provision to be dealt with but sec. 50 of that Act and sec. 80 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 are practically identical. So what the Bombay High Court has stated about sec. 50 of the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 will with equal force apply to sec. 80 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act. The Bombay High Court in that case has held that public streets are vested in the municipality for the purpose of being maintained as public streets under sec. 50 of the Bombay District Municipal Act and that section expressly declares that public streets so vested in them shall be applied by them as trustees subject to the provisions and for the purposes of the Act. The Bombay High Court ultimately then held as follows and it is very material for our purposes: "therefore it rests upon anyone who supports the action of the municipality to show that it had statutory authority to divert a portion of a public street in the manner that has been done. "in that case part of the public street was given by the municipality for the purpose of doing timber business and that was being done for at least 50 years prior to the date of the decision in the years 1926.
( 3 ) SIMILARLY the Division Bench of this court in the case of PARASRAM MANJIMAL and ORS. V. THE KALOL MUNICIPALITY. KALOL A. I. R. 1972 GUJARAT 54 XIII G. L. R. 498 also in paragraph 7 of the reported judgment held as follows:"7. The present case with which we are concerned is also in respect of obstruction and encroachments upon public streets and it empowers as well as lays down a duty on the municipalities and their officers to take necessary action under su