B. S. KAPADIA, N. H. BHATT, J.

( 1 ) THESE 17 matters are taken up together because of the common question pertaining to the interpretation of sec. 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. being Act No. 33 of 1976 but ceiling factual situations make us divide these petitions into three groups. First 9 matters out of the serial numbers mentioned at the top of this judgment simplicitor deal with only one point namely whether the Government before rejecting an application for exemption under sec. 20 (1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 hereinafter referred to as the Act for brevitys sake is bound to give audience to the person who has applied for exemption. In the next six matters commencing from the Special Civil Application No. 2895/83 mentioned at the to of this judgment the above question is certainly there but there is one additional point also that was canvassed by the petitioners of these six petitions. They allege that the rejection of their applications was bad for ant of any opportunity of audience having been extended to them but those rejections were bad also on the ground that the Government had brought to bear on their mind extraneous considerations in the form of Governments policy decisions in respect of granting exemption for industrial purposes So in these six petitions the point that will be required to be considered is what is the scope and ambit of the Governments power while dealing with such applications and whether the Government is competent to lay down guide-lines even if those guidelines tend to whittle down the comparatively wider scope of power conferred on the State Government by the Parliament under whose authority alone the lands in various agglomerations could be declared surplus and acquired or deemed to be acquired. In the last two matters the declaration of the surplus land has been effected even before the applications made by those parties had come to be dealt with one way or the other. Obviously but Incidentally the question about the Governments alleged obligation to hear those petitioners in that regard also would arise. We shall take up the last group first. Sec. 20 of the Act is reproduced below:20 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter. (a) where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government is satisfied either on its own motion or otherwise that having regard to the location of such land the purposes for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require it is necessary or expedient is the public interest so to do that Government may by order exempt subject to such conditions if any as may be specified in the order such vacant land from the provisions of this Chapter. (b ). . . . . . (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

( 2 ) CHAPTER-III of the Act containing secs. 3 to 24 deals with ceiling on vacant lands. The scheme of the Act is too well-known to call for any repeated elaboration. It is truism to state that other stringent provisions of the Chapter-III of the Act are subject to sec. 20 of the Act which begins with a non-obstante clause. This means that the declaration about the land being surplus can be made only after the decision on an application under sec. 20 of the Act for exemption is taken. The over-all consideration of the provisions of Chapter-III pre-supposes that the full effect will be given to all the provisions so that a coherent system of working out the problem is evolved. If a declaration under secs. 8 (1) and 8 (3) proceeds one way or the other decision of an application for exemption it will be tantamount to putting a cart before a horse and if the application (covered under that declaration) would ultimately come to be granted and it will be a meaningless exercise that is why we say that after filing of a statement under sec. 6 of the Act if a citizen ap

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