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1985 Supreme(Guj) 117

Gujarat High Court
Judgename :J.P.DESAI
PATEL CHHOTABHAI SOMABHAI - Appellant
Versus
JAISWAL KESHAVLAL RAMDAYAL - Respondent
First Appeal 588 of 1978
Decided On : 08/01/1985

Advocates Appeared: B.J.SHELAT, S.R.SHAH, T.R.MISHRA

Headnote:

Code of Civil Procedure , 1908 - Section 2 (2) , 97 and 153 - Order 6 - Rule 17 Tenancy Act - Section 25a and 85a - Contention between the parties is se regards the request by the defendants to amend the Written Statement after the preliminary decree was passed by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court and after the preliminary decree had become final. The defendants submitted application before the trial Court and requested the trial Court to permit them to amend the Written Statement by raising a contention that defendants were tenants of the suit lands prior to the suit transaction and they were in possession of the suit lands as tenants and the tenancy was revived on the Court passing a preliminary decree and therefore possession cannot be awarded to the plain tiffs as they had become deemed purchase of the land under the provisions of the Tenancy Act - A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of - It is final when such adjudication completely disposed of the suit - It may be partly preliminary and partly final. Sec. 97 of the Code where any party aggrieved by a preliminary decree passed after the commencement of this Cede does not appeal from such decree he shall be precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree – Held, Learned advocate Mr. Shelat relying upon the discussion made at para. 10 of the judgment incontended that it was not necessary that the contention about tenancy should be raised in the Written Statement and that when there was a contest between the parties on this question it was required to be referred to Mamlatdar under sec. 85a of the Tenancy Act - It is difficult to read the observations of the Supreme Court at para. 10 that even though any such question which is required to be decided or dealt with by an authority under the Tenancy Act is not raised in the pleadings then also the question will be required to be referred to the competent authority under said Act moment such a question is raised before the Court - The observations made by the Supreme Court at para. 10 are made on the footing that issue arises between parties upon contest between them. In a civil suit issue would arise only out of pleadings and when there is no contention raised in the pleadings the issue does not arise and therefore the question of referring the same also does not arise - Appeal dismissed

J. P. DESAI, J.

( 1 ) (HIS Lordships after Stating the facts of the Case further of served ).

( 2 )

( 3 )

( 4 ) THE main bone of contention between the parties is se regards the request by the defendants to amend the Written Statement after the preliminary decree was passed by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court and after the preliminary decree had become final. The defendants submitted application Ex. 239 before the trial Court and requested the trial Court to permit them to amend the Written Statement by raising a contention that the defendants were tenants of the suit lands prior to the suit transaction and they were in possession of the suit lands as tenants and the tenancy was revived on the Court passing a preliminary decree and therefore possession cannot be awarded to the plain tiffs as they had become deemed purchase of the land under the provisions of the Tenancy Act. This application was opposed by the plaintiffs. The learned trial Judge passed a speaking order below this application on 30-11-1977 and rejected the same. The defendants appellants have contended before this Court in this appeal that the trial Court should have allowed the amendment sought for by the defendants to amend the Written Statement as the proceedings for passing final decree were continuation of the original suit.

( 5 ) WE now come to the question whether the defendants mere entitled to pray for amendment of the Written Statement as prayed for by them vide application Ex. 232 in view of the fact that no such contention was raised at any time before the passing of the preliminary decree.

( 6 ) NOW Decree is defined by sec. 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure as follows :-"decree means the formal expression of an (adjudication which so far as regards the Court expressing it conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within sec. 44 but shall not include- (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an (b) any order of dismissal for default. Explanation: A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposed of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final. Sec. 97 of the Code reads as follows:-"where any party aggrieved by a preliminary decree passed after the commencement of this Cede does not appeal from such decree he shall be precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree". The definition of Decree shows that it may be either preliminary or final. It does not make any distinction between a preliminary decree and a final decree. Reading the provisions of sec. 2 (2) with sec. 97 of the Code the position is very clear that the defendants having not raised a contention at any stage before the passing of the preliminary decree that they were tenants with regard to the suit lands they cannot raise that contention in the proceedings taken out for passing a final decree. This position is made very clear in some decisions which I shall refer to hereafter.

( 7 ) IN the case of Venkata Reddy v. Pethi Reddy. A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 992 after referring to the provisions of sec. 2 (2) and sec. 97 of the Code it is held as follows:-"a decision is said to be final when so far as the Court renlering it is concerned it is unalterable except by resort to such provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as permit its reversal modification or amendment. Similarly a final decision would mean a decision which would operate as res judicata between the parties if it is not sought to be modifiedor reversed by preferring an appeal or a revision or a review application as is permitted by the Code. A preliminary decree passed whether it is in a. mortgage suit or a. p


















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