1992 Supreme(Guj) 343
Gujarat High Court
Judgename :B.J.Shethna
CHANDULAL HARILAL LODHIYA - Appellant
Versus
STATE - Respondent
A.U.S. 262 of 1992
Decided On : 12/28/1992
Headnote:Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
-Order granting bail-Scope of interference-Where trial court has misdirected himself and wrongly exercised the discretion in favour of accused observation of Supreme Court in case limiting scope of interference by High Court would not be attracted-Once prima facie strong case against accused for serious offence punishable under sec. 306 I.P.C. is made out bail should be refused.
The judgment of Supreme Court in Bhagirathsinh s case would not come to the rescue of the respondents-accused in this case. Because, as pointed out earlier, the learned Trial Judge has totally misdirected himself and wrongly exercised the discretion in favour of the accused. Once it is found that there is a prima facie strong case against the accused for the serious offence punishable u/s 306 of I.P.C. bail should be refused.
( 1 ) THIS Revision Application is filed by the petitioner, who is the original complainant, against the order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge on 8-7-1992 releasing the respondents Nos. 2 to 4-original accused on bail. Original accused No. 1 is the father-in-law, original accused no. 2 is the mother-in-law and original accused No. 3 is the husband of the deceased.
( 2 ) BEFORE dealing with the contentions raised by Mr. Tripathi against the accused-respondent No. 4-husband of the deceased, preliminary objection raised by Mr. Nanavati, learned Advocate appearing for the respondents, is required to be dealt with. Mr. Nanavati submitted that this Revision application is filed by the private party against the order of grant of bail passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge and the same has not been challenged by the State by filing application before this Court for cancellation of that bail order. Therefore, this Court should not entertain this Revision application. It is true that the State has not challenged the order of bail passed by the learned trial Judge. But merely because the State has not challenged the same before this Court, it would not be a ground for this Court not to entertain this application filed at the instance of private party. Present petitioner is none else but the original complainant and the unfortunate father of the deceased and if the State will not prefer to file an application for cancellation of bail granted in favour of the accused, then except the complainant who else will come before this Court ? Therefore, in my view, the petitioner could be the best person to approach this Court for cancellation of bail. There is no law which prohibits this Court from entertaining the application for cancellation of bail filed by a private party, when the State has not come before this court against the impugned order of grant of bail passed by the trial Court. There may be more than one reason why the State has not challenged the impugned order of bail and this Court would also not like to go into it. At this stage it is required to be stated that the learned A. P. P. Mr. K. C. Shah has also supported the case of the petitioner and urged that bail order passed in favour of the accused-husband must be cancelled, which is in my view, is more than sufficient to do so, if this Court is satisfied that the accusedhusband ought not to have been released on bail. I may also make it clear that even if the learned A. P. P. had not supported the case of the petitioner, even then this Court would have cancelled the bail of the accused-husband, if otherwise this Court was satisfied about the fact that the accused-husband is wrongly released on bail. Thus, there is no substance in the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Nanavati, learned Advocate appearing for the respondents Nos. 2 to 4, that this Court should not entertain this application, which is. filed at the instance of private party in absence of any application filed by the State against the order of grant of bail passed by the learned trial Judge.
( 3 ) MR. Tripathi, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, has vehemently submitted that the learned trial Judge has much relied upon the fact that the offence punishable under Sec. 306 of I. P. C. is not punishable with life imprisonment like Sec. 302 of I. P. C. Therefore, the accused could be released on bail. It is true that offence punishable under Sec. 306 of I. P. C. is punishable with maximum punishment of ten years. None the less it can never be said that offence punishable under Sec. 306 is not a serious offence. In my opinion, if it is not more serious than offence of murder punishable under Sec. 302 of I. P. C,, it can never be said that offence punishable under sec. 306 of I. P. C. is less serious than that. Merely because there is a difference in the punishment for the aforesaid two offences, namely, fur the offence of murder punishable under Sec. 302 it is death or life imprison