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1994 Supreme(Guj) 50

Gujarat High Court
Judgename :A.N.Divecha
KANAIYALAL MANEKLAL SHETH - Appellant
Versus
COMPETENT AUTHORITY and ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR - Respondent
S.C.A. 2734 of 1986
Decided On : 02/23/1994

Advocates Appeared: D.C.DAVE, J.R.Nanavati, M.C.BHATT, MEHUL SHARAD SHAH, P.S.CHAMPANERI

Headnote:Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976-Sec. -21(1), read with Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules-Rule -11-A Condition No. 3-Terms and conditions subject to which a person -can hold excess vacant land-Can Competent Authority lay down any -other condition not prescribed under the Act and Rules-Held, No-Condition -that construction should be started within one year of the permission -is not prescribed under the Act and Rules-Imposition of said condition -and cancellation of permission for alleged breach of condition held -invalid-Time consumed in litigation not to be counted.The wordings of Rule 11-A of the Rules buttress the view -taken by me with respect to interpretation of the concluding part -of Section 21(1) of the Act. It has been clearly provided therein -that the terms and conditions which could be imposed while granting -permission under Section 21(1) of the Act could be none else but what -are specified in Schedule I-A appended to the Rules. As pointed out -hereinabove, the Rules have been made subject to the scrutiny of both -Houses of Parliament as provided in Section 46(3) of the Act. Not -for a moment it can be doubted that Parliament did scrutinise the -Rules for the purpose of finding out whether or not the legislative -policy behind the enactment has been carried out therein. If, on scrutiny, -Parliament had found that the Rules in that regard were not in consonance -with the Scheme of Section 21(1) of the Act, it would have suggested -modifications therein or it would have indicated that such Rules should -not be made in exercise of its power under Section 46(3) of the Act. -Nothing of the sort appears to have been done. In this view of the -matter also, there is no escape from the conclusion that the conditions -to be imposed while granting permission under Section 21(1) of the -Act could be none other than the conditions prescribed by the Rules -or, in other words, set out in Schedule I-A appended thereto. There -could be thousand and one reasons for delay in commencement of the -construction work. What is required to be seen is whether or not the -scheme is completed within the stipulated time-limit. In that view -of the matter also, I am of the opinion that imposition of such condition -as to the time-limit within which the construction activity has to -be commenced is not so much in public interests as is sought to be -made out. The Competent Authority has no power to prescribe conditions -other than what are set out in Schedule I-A appended to the Rules. -This may be subject to the rider that certain conditions in-built -in the scheme of Section 21(1) of the Act can or may be prescribed. -For example, a condition may be prescribed that not more than one -dwelling unit must be allotted to one family belonging to the weaker -sections of the society. This would be in consonance with the binding -law declared by the Apex Court in its ruling in the case of Shantistar -Builders vs. Narayan Khimalal Totame, reported in AIR 1990 SC at -page 630 (vide paragraph 17 at page 635). As aforesaid, such conditions -as are in consonance with the legislative policy reflected in Section -21(1) of the Act may be imposed, for such conditions would be found -in-built thereunder. Except such conditions, the Competent Authority -cannot impose any condition other than those prescribed by the Rules -or, in other words, those set out in Schedule I-A thereto. The conditions -that can be imposed while granting the permission thereunder would -only be the conditions as set out in Schedule I-A appended to the -Rules and such other conditions as are found in-built in the legislative -policy reflected therein. As pointed out hereinabove, the Competent -Authority had no power to impose any such condition with respect to -the time-limit within which the construction work was required to -be commenced by the petitioner in each case. In that view of the matter, -the petitioner in each case could not be subjected to any action for -its breach under Section 21(2) thereof. The fact that each petitioner -agreed to abide by the terms and conditions to be imposed by the Competent -Authority while making an application under Section 21(1) of the Act -is no ground to subject him to abide by any and every condition imposed -by the Competent Authority without any authority of law. It is a settled -principle of law that there cannot be any estoppel against a statute.

       [Paras 12, 15, 16, 17 & 18]

       Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976-Sec. -21(1)-Object, purpose and legislative intent-Explained.

       The scheme of Section 21 of the Act makes it clear that -a landholder would be permitted to retain his excess holding if he -undertakes to construct dwelling-units for the weaker sections of -the society. This is done because it would be well- nigh impossible -for the Government or Governmental instrumentalities like a statutory -Housing Board to undertake any construction work of dwelling-units -for the weaker sections of the society on a mass scale or on a very -large scale. It appears that the Legislature in its wisdom has therefore -thought it fit to allow individual landholders to undertake such exercise.

       [Para 10]

       Interpretation of Statute-Word "Prescribed" -in sec. 2(j) of Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act-Means prescribed -by Rules under the Act.

       The word "prescribed" is defined in Section 2(j) of the -Act to mean prescribed by rules under the Act.

       [Para 4]

       Words and Phrases-Include-Sec. 21(i) of Urban -Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act-Not to be always read as word -of expansion-In the present context it is a direction to the rule -making authority.

       Word "includes" cannot always be read as a word of extension -without reference to the context. The word "including" in the context -is a direction to the rule-making authority to keep in mind that a -condition as to the time-limit within which such buildings are to -be constructed has to be prescribed. The inclusive portion of the -statutory provision was in the nature of a guideline given to the -rule-making authority while exercising the power inter alia under -Section 46(2)(j) of the Act. The idea appears to be that the rule-making -authority need not overlook a condition in that regard while prescribing -other necessary conditions. This aspect of the Scheme of Section 21(1) -of the Act is to be borne in mind while construing the word "including" -occurring in the concluding part of Section 21(1) of the Act. In this -view of the matter, there is no escape from the conclusion that the -context in which the word "including" occurs in the statutory provision -of Section 21(1) of the Act, that word has to be interpreted as giving -a meaning to the expression rather than as expanding the scope thereof -or extending the power of the Competent Authority in that regard.

       [Paras 7, 8, 10 & 11]

       Words and Phrases-Maxims-No law would compel -a perform an impossibility -Cancellation of permission by Competent -Authority-Cancellation set aside-Party cannot be blamed for -not completing construction within stipulated time limit-Maxim -applied.

       At this stage it would be desirable to take note of certain -well-known legal maxims. Firstly, no law would compel a person to -perform an impossibility. If such landholder whose permission under -Section 21(1) of the Act is cancelled for contravention of a condition -which could not be imposed by the Competent Authority is required -to surrender the concerned excess vacant land on expiry of the stipulated -five-year time limit, the State Government will not be able to provide -dwelling-units to those members of the weaker sections of the society -who might have opted for such dwelling-units for which such permission -was granted. They would be left at the mercy of the government or -the governmental instrumentalities for fulfilment of their dreams -of having their own house. Instead, if such landholder is allowed -to proceed further with implementation of his scheme, those members -of the weaker sections of the society who have opted for such dwelling-units -might expect realisation of their dream-house in certain specified -time-limit though it could be delayed by some period on account of -pendency of the litigation.

       [Paras 20 & 21]

A. N. DIVECHA, J.

( 1 ) THE main question arising in all these petitions is common and it is to the effect as to what conditions can be imposed by the competent Authority while approving the Scheme under Sec. 21 (1) of the Urban land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (the Act for brief ). Since common question of law and fact arise in all these four petitions, I have thought it fit to dispose of all these four petitions by this common judgment of mine.

( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to these petitions move in a narrow compass. Each petitioner applied for permission under Sec. 21 (1) of the Act in the prescribed form. By his order passed on 30th October 1979 in each case, respondent No. 1 granted such permission to each petitioner. Its copy is at Annexure-A to each petition. It was accompanied by certain conditions separately annexed therewith. Condition No. 3 thereof inter alia required the petitioner in each petition to commence construction within one year from the date of the order and to give intimation regarding commencement of the construction work to the concerned superintending Engineer. It appears that no intimation regarding commencement of the construction work was given to the concerned Superintending Engineer. Thereupon, it was presumed that the construction work was not commenced within the stipulated period of one year from the date of the order at Annexure-A to each petition. Thereupon respondent No. 1 issued one show cause notice of 8th/9th July 1981 calling upon each petitioner to show cause why the permission granted to him by the order at Annexure-A to each petition should not be cancelled. A copy of the show cause notice is at Annexure-B to each petition. Each petitioner filed his reply thereto on 23rd July 1981. Its copy is at Annexure-C to each petition. After hearing the parties, by his order passed on 7th/9th December 1982 pursuant to the aforesaid show cause notice, respondent No. 1 cancelled the permission at Annexure- a to each petition. A copy of the aforesaid order passed by respondent No. 1 on 7th/9th December 1982 is at Annexure-G to each petition. That aggrieved each petitioner. Each one carried the matter in appeal before the Appellate Authority (respondent No. 2 herein) as provided in Sec. 33 of the Act. A copy of the memo of appeal in each case is at Annexure-H to each petition. It appears that all the appeals preferred by all the four petitioners came to be heard together and by his common order passed on 11th March 1986 in the aforesaid four appeals, respondents no. 2 dismissed them. Its copy is at Annexure-I to each petition. That again aggrieved each petitioner. Each one has thereupon moved this Court by means of his respective petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for questioning the correctness of the impugned order at Annexure-G to each petition as affirmed in appeal by the appellate order at Annexure-I to each petition.

( 3 ) SHRI Nanavaty for the petitioner has urged that respondent No. 1 had no authority or power to impose any condition with respect to the time-limit for commencement of the construction work in terms of the approved Scheme in view of the relevant provisions contained in Sec. 21 (1) of the Act. Shri Bhatt and Shri shah as Intervenors have reiterated the very submission with further elaboration. Shri Dave for the respondents has contended to the contrary. Shri Champaneri as an Intervenor has followed the line of arguments drawn on behalf of the respondents.

( 4 ) IN order to appreciate rival submissions urged before me, it would be quite proper to look at Sec. 21 of the Act. It reads :"21. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, where a person holds any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and such person declares within such time, in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed before the competent authority that such land is to be utilised for the construction of dwelling-units (each such dwe




































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