Gujarat High Court
Judgename :B.N.KIRPAL, SHARAD D.DAVE
Gujarat State Fertilisers Company Limited - Appellant
Versus
Association of Officers, G.S.F.C., Fertilizernagar - Respondent
Letters Patent Appeal 375 of 1985
Decided On : 02/02/1994
The mere use of the words `Gujarat State would also -not indicate that it is a public company. Had the appellant been a -public company, the provisions of Section 617 of the Companies Act -would have been clearly applicable. That apart, it is clear that the -name has been selected because, the State of Gujarat was one of the -Promoters. But no public duty is being performed by this Company and -it is like any other Joint Venture Undertaking.
[Para 22]
Companies Act, 1956-Secs. 617 & 619-Public company -under section 617-Auditing of accounts by Govt. nominee under -section 619-Is for safe-guard of interest of Govt.-The appellant -company is not a public company.
The appellant is not a `Public Company , within the meaning -of that expression under Section 617 of the Companies Act. It is no -doubt true that its accounts have to be audited by the Auditors nominated -by the Government. But, that is because of the provisions of Section -619B of the Companies Act. The said section provides that if not less -than 51% of the paid up capital of the Company is held by the Central -Government or the State Government, and any Corporations, then the -provision of Section 619 would apply, which, inter alia, provides -for the appointment of an Auditor by the Central Government. The said -section merely safeguards the interests of the Government or the Government -Corporation as a shareholder, but would not make such a Company as -a public company.
[Para 21]
Constitution of India, 1950-Arts. 12 & 21-Applicability -of Art. 21-Appellant Company neither `State nor `authority within -Art. 12-Art. 21 not attracted.
The appellant is not a `State , or an `Authority , under -Article 12 and that the provisions of Article 21are also not attracted.
[Para 25]
Mr. J.M. Thakore, Advocate General, with Mr. -S.N. Shelat, Advocate, for the appellant & Mr. S.K. Zaveri, -Advocate, for the respondents.
Cases Referred :
R.D Shetty vs. The International Airport Authority -of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628; Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib, -AIR 1981 SC 487-Applied.
Tekraj Vasandi alias, K.L. Basandhi vs. Union of India -and others, AIR 1988 SC 469; Rajasthan State Electricity Board, -Jaipur vs. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1857; K.M. Thomas vs. Cochin -Refineries Ltd. and Ors., AIR 1982 Kerala 248 & P.B. Ghayalod -vs. M/s. Maruti Udyog Ltd. and Ors, AIR 1992 Delhi 145-Relied -on.
M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1987 -SC 1086-Followed.
( 1 ) EVEN more than two decades after the question first arose, the Counsel are still debating on the question as to what is a state, within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. That is the principal contention raised in this appeal filed by a Public Limited company, challenging the judgment of the learned single Judge, who had allowed a writ petition filed by five er six employees, whose services had been terminated.
( 2 ) RESPONDENTS Nos. 2 to 6 were working with the appellant, which, inter alia, carries on the business of manufacture and sale of fertilizar, and that the terms and conditions of recruitment and service were regulated by the Service Rules framed by the appellant. Rule 44 contained a provision, which enabled the Company to discharge or determine services of an employee after his confirmation. The said Rule, inter alia, provided that after confirmation, an employee in Grade I or grade II may be discharged from service of the Company "for sufficient reasons by the Competent Authority", after giving him three months notice in writing in that behalf, or salary in lieu of such notice.
( 3 ) THE Managing Director of the company passed an order dated 6th of may 1984, discharging the said respondents from service under the said rule 44. Reasons for the discharge were recorded by the Managing Director, but the same were not communicated to the said respondents. The order of discharge merely stated that their services were being terminated under said Rule 44. The appeal filed by the said respondents, within the Company itself, being unsuccessful, they filed a writ petition, being Special Civil Application No. 5039 of 1984, challenging the said order of discharge.
( 4 ) BEFORE the learned single Judge, it was, inter alia, contended on behalf of the respondents that it was not possible for the Company to terminate the service merely by giving three months pay and without holding any enquiry and without recording any reasons.
( 5 ) THE appellant herein had submitted that it was not a state and, therefore, a petition under Article 226 of the constitution was maintainable. It was also submitted that the services of the respondents had been terminated under rule 44 and such termination was justifiable on the facts and in the circumstances of the case.
( 6 ) THAT petition was allowed by the learned single Judge, who came to the conclusion that the order of discharge, which was passed, was really by way, of punishment, and as the appellant was a state, within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the said respondents were entitled to be reinstated as their services could not have been discharged without following the principles of natural justice.
( 7 ) IT has been submitted by the learned advocate General that the learned single judge fell in error in holding that the appellant was a state. For the reasons, to which we shall presently revert to. the contention is that the appellant is not a state, and even if it be assumed that a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable, even then, the relationship between the appellant and the respondents being purely contractual in nature, the relief of retirement should not have been granted. It was, of course, submitted that the order of discharge which was passed was wholly justified.
( 8 ) DEALING with the question whether the appellant is a state, the learned single Judge referred to the of-quoted judgment on the point in issue, viz. , those of R. D. Shetty v. The International airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 and Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, air 1981 SC 487, where the tests for determining whether a Corporation could be said an instrumentality or an agency of the Government had been culled out. The tests, which were summarised in Ajay hasias case, and which were referred to by the learned single Judge, are as follows:" (1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by governme
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