( 1 ) WHAT indeed is the right, nay more than that the privilege of the workmen, regarding, "speedy justice" under the Workmens Compensation act, 1923 and/or under any other Labour Laws and for that purpose even further indeed what are the corresponding duties, firstly, enjoined upon the Workmen commissioner and/or any other Labour Courts and for that purpose, in case if there is any insufficiency of number of Judges and Courts then in that case, that of, secondly, the duty of the Government also in this regard, under Art. 21 of the constitution of India to provide as many number of adequate Courts and Judges for speeding up the proceedings before the Courts. This precisely is principal thrust and theme of the discussion and ultimate finding to the questions raised here centering around this Civil Revision Application.

( 2 ) TO state few relevant facts briefly, applicant Naniben, a poor illiterate lady, aged 55 years, filed the compensation application, the same being W. C. Application no. 14 of 1985 before the Workmens Compensation Commissioner, Bhavnagar against two respondents, viz. , H. K. Dave Private Limited, Bhavnagar and M/s. Harlalka M. C. and Co. , Calcutta, inter alia claiming compensation to the tune of Rs. 55,000. 00 on the ground of death of her son Rajesh who got electrocuted during the course of his employment with the Company. After the institution of this proceedings, the applicant was further constrained to submit an application Ex. 44 dated 1-10-1990 for joining Messrs. India Potash Limited as defendant No. 3 over and above the opponent Nos. 1 and 2, as it was also in the alternative jointly and severally liable to pay compensation. This was rejected by the learned commissioner vide his order dated 17-12-1990 and that too imposing the cost on the applicant, giving rise to the present Revision Application.

( 3 ) HEARD learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties.

( 4 ) ON perusing the above order, four things quite surface to be shockingly noticed at once. They are, firstly, when the application Ex. 44 was called out for hearing, the learned Advocate for the applicant was absent and without hearing him the same came to be dismissed. Secondly, the application Ex. 44 came to be disposed off because the W. C. Application out of which it was arising was of the year 1985 and thus according to the learned Commissioner, the same having become pretty stale it was required to be disposed off within 3 to 6 months. Thirdly, the application Ex. 44 in question was submitted with a view to defeat and delay the proceedings. and fourthly quite shocking and surprising the imposition of the cost and that too on the applicant-lady while rejecting her application Exh. 44.

( 5 ) NOW, none of the aforesaid considerations on the basis of which the application Ex. 44 came to be rejected, has any substance worth the name. Rather to be precise and put it positively, the same is a manifest specimen of totally perverse approach calling for immediate quashing and setting aside of the impugned order. 5. 1 Whether the learned Commissioner was justified in dismissing Exh. 44 application of the claimant to her utter prejudice in absence of her learned Advocate ? In this regard, it is indeed quite true that ordinarily the absence of the learned advocate, in the Court-room when the matter is called out for hearing is prima facie quite disturbing thing, as it does waste the precious time of the Court and accordingly such remissness if of the regular recurrence cannot be countenanced lightly to be encouraged to the greatest prejudice of the Court disciplines and the overall Constitutional call for the "speedy justice" enshrined in Art. 21 of the constitution. But at the same time in the instant case, and for that purpose even in many other such given cases, what ought we do not know that on the particular date and time when the learned Advocate appearing for the applicant did not remain present, perhaps he was having s