1994 Supreme(Guj) 153

Gujarat High Court
Judgename :H.L.Gokhale, M.B.SHAH, Y.B.BHATT
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF AHMEDABAD - Appellant
Versus
VOLTAS LIMITED - Respondent
C.A. 1464 of 1990
Decided On : 05/06/1994

Headnote:Limitation Act, 1963-Sec. 5-Condonation of delay-"Sufficient -cause"-Is not a question of principle but a question of -fact-Condonation of delay therefore depends upon facts and circumstances -of each case-Words & Phrase -Sufficient cause-Scope and -meaning-Explained-(Per majority of M.B. Shah & Y.B. Bhatt, -JJ.)

       The phrase `sufficient cause as occurring in section -5 of the Limitation Act pertains to the establishment of the appropriate -facts before the Court to which the Court can apply its mind and arrive -at a conclusion regarding the sufficiency of the cause or otherwise. -In essence, therefore, the phrase `sufficient cause is not a question -of principle, but is a question of fact. Hence, whether to condone -the delay or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each -case as `sufficient cause for condonation of delay depends only on -the facts placed by the applicants before the Court. A plain reading -of this provision indicates that firstly this is an enabling provision -and nothing more. It enables a court to condone the delay, subject -to the court being satisfied that there was "sufficient cause" -for the delay. The Court can only examine the submissions of the parties -on the basis of the facts averred and made out in the application -for condonation. The Court cannot decide the sufficiency of the cause -dehors the facts pleaded and made out. Whether the cause shown was -sufficient or otherwise, cannot be converted into a question of principle. -We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the phrase -"sufficient cause" involves only questions of fact to be considered -by the court dealing with the application for condonation of delay, -and in considering the sufficiency of the cause, no question of principle -is involved, except that a liberal view should be adopted in the examination -and interpretation of the facts which seek to establish "sufficient -cause", as laid down in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, -Anantnag (supra). The phrase "sufficient cause" as occuring in section -5 of the Limitation Act pertains to the establishment of the appropriate -facts before the court to which the Court can apply its mind and arrive -at a conclusion as to whether the cause is sufficient or otherwise. -In essence, therefore, the phrase "sufficient cause" is not a question -of principle, but is a question of fact.

       [Paras 30, 5 & 11]

       Limitation Act, 1963-Sec. 5-Condonation of delay-On -"Sufficient Cause" -Whether delay caused by public bodies -on account of administrative reasons/administrative procedure/administrative -delay would <BIipso facto establish "sufficient cause"-Held, -No-Sufficiency of cause must be established on facts-No discriminatory -favour can be granted to Government or statutory bodies (Per majority -of M.B. Shah & Y.B. Bhatt, JJ.)-(Per minority view of Gokhale, -J.)-Small delays by public bodies should be generally condoned-Constitution -of India-Art. 14.

       The plea on the part of the applicants that the delay -was caused by `administrative delay/ administrative reasons/ administrative -procedure (and analogous expressions) is merely an averment in the -nature of a plea which by itself and ipso facto does not establish -sufficiency of the cause for condonation. Precise factual reasons -for the delay within the general ambit of the said phrase must be -established and that too to the satisfaction of the Court. Hence, -it cannot be held that, because the applicant is a Municipal Corporation -or a statutory authority, delay should be condoned even if no reason -or cause for delay in filing appeal is mentioned in the application -and mere mention of the phrase `administrative delay in the application -for condonation of delay is no sufficient cause by any standard. The -quantum or extent of the delay has no direct nexus in law with the -sufficiency of the cause, inasmuch as the two are independent and -diverse factors. In the context of section 5 of the Limitation Act -what is material is the sufficiency of the cause which is required -to be established to the satisfaction of the Court. If the Court finds -that the cause for delay is sufficient, the extent of the delay is -immaterial. The plea on the part of the applicants that the delay -was caused by "administrative delay/administrative reasons/administrative -procedure" (and analogous expressions) is merely an averment in the -nature of a plea and, that by itself and ipso facto, does not establish -sufficientcy of the cause for condonation. Precise factual reasons -for the delay within the general ambit of the said phrase must be -established on the facts of the case, and must so be established -to the satisfaction of the Court. Small delays in the filing of appeals -and applications by public bodies should be generally condoned.

       [Paras 30, 13, 11 & 55]

       Limitation Act, 1963-Sec. 5-Condonation of delay-Criterion-Whether -merits of substantive case can override the "sufficiency of cause"-Held, -No-Merit of the case is not predominating factor-Sufficiency -of cause must be established-(Gokhale J. dissenting).

       The merits of the substantial case in respect of which -condonation is sought cannot over-ride the provisions of section 5 -of the Limitation Act and the merits of the case cannot be regarded -as either the sole factor or a predominant factor while adjudicating -upon the sufficiency of the cause for condonation of delay. The merits -of the substantial case in respect of which condonation is sought -over-ride the provisions of sections 3 and 5 of the Limitation Act -and the merits of the case cannot be regarded as the sole factor or -a predominant factor while adjudicating upon the sufficiency of the -cause for condonation of delay. The contention is to the effect that -the merits of the substantive matter is the sole criterion, or at -the very least a predominant factor, to be borne in mind by the Court -while considering the application for condoning delay. To our mind, -this submission puts the cart before the horse. The substantive matter -in respect of which delay is sought to be condoned has no existence -in law so far as the Court is concerned, until the delay is condoned. -White considering an application for condonation of delay filed by -a public body, the merits of the main matter should also be considered -a predominant factor.

       [Paras 11, 30, 7 & 55]

       Limitation Act, 1963-Sec. 5-Condonation of delay-Quantum -of delay-Period is of no consequences-If sufficient cause -proved even long delays may be condoned-Otherwise delay of short -period may not be condoned.