( 1 ) THE question that arises before this Full Bench is the interpretation of judgment of another Full Bench in the case of Gorva Vibhag co-op. Housing Society Association v. State, 1992 (1) GLR 654 on the question as to what is that "reasonable period" under Sec. 32a (1) of the Bombay Stamp act, 1958 for initiating action by the registering officer. The said provision did not prescribe any time limit and, therefore, it was contended before the earlier Full Bench that it gave arbitrary powers to the registering authority to initiate proceedings after lapse of reasonable time and to harass the citizens by misusing powers contained in Sec. 32a. The Full Bench negatived this contention holding that:"in our view, this contention requires to be rejected because it is a settled law that the powers under the statutory provisions are to be exercised within the reasonable period. "the relevant paragraph of the Full Bench judgment is paragraph 36 which reads as follows :"it was also contended that as no time limit is prescribed for initiating the action by the registering officer it gives arbitrary powers to the registring officer to initiate proceedings after lapse of unreasonable time and to harass the concerned person by misusing the provisions contained under Sec. 37a. In our view, this contention requires to be rejected because it is a settled law that the powers under the statutory provisions are to be exercised within the reasonable period. The reasonable period varies in the facts and circumstances of each case and various provisions of the Act. It should be noted that under Sec. 32a (4) the legislature has prescribed maximum period of two years from the date of registration of any instrument for initiating suo motu proceedings by the Collector for examining the instrument for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness of the consideration or the market value of the property which is subject-matter of the conveyance and the duty payable thereon. Therefore, in no set of circumstances the registering officer can exercise his power of referring the instrument to the Collector beyond the reasonable period (under Sec. 32a) Not only this, the learned Advocate General has stated that the Superintendent of Stamps and Inspector General of Registration, Gujarat State, has issued a Circular dated 7/12/1991 to the effect that the registering officer should issue a notice within one month from the date of presentation of the document for registration for payment of the amount of difference in stamp duty within one month from the date of receipt of the notice. If the difference in stamp duty is not paid he should immediately refer the case to the concerned Deputy Collector (Stamp Duty-Valuation department ). The learned Advocate General further stated that the Deputy Secretary, revenue Department has informed that in Rules 3 (2), 4 (2) and (3) appropriate time limit ranging from one month to three months would be prescribed. Considering the aforesaid statements made by the learned Advocate General and the amended provisions of the Act, in our view even prior to issuance of Circular dated 7/12/1991 by the Superintendent of Stamps and Inspector General of Registration, Gujarat state, three months period can be considered to be the reasonable period for issuance of notice by the registering officer under Sec. 32a (1) read with Rule 3 clause (2) of the Bombay Stamp (Determination of Market Value of Property) Rules. 1984. If the power is exercised beyond that period then the order can be set aside unless the facts justifying delay are pointed out. "

( 2 ) THE question that arises before this Full Bench is whether the period of two years mentioned by the earlier Full Bench is the rigid and maximum period being "reasonable period" or whether it is open to the authority to point out facts justifying delay beyond two years.

( 3 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 744 of 1992 and other cognate matters, a Division Bench (of which on