( 1 ) THIS is an application, alleging that the respondents have committed contempt of Court and that action should be taken against them.

( 2 ) IT appears that there was a dispute between the parties, which was the subject -matter of an Award of the Industrial Tribunal on a reference having been made under Sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The said Award was challenged by the respondents by filing a writ petition in this Court, but without success. As the terms of the Award had not been complied with by the respondents, the petitioner herein filed an application for contempt. At the hearing of the same, an undertaking was given by the respondents that subject to the outcome of the Special Leave petition, which had been filed, the respondents shall comply with the terms of the award and the judgment of this Court, upholding the Award.

( 3 ) THE Special Leave Petition has been dismissed. According to the respondents, they have complied with the terms of the Award, in as much as the employees have been regularised with effect from the date of their initial appointment, to the regular scales and, further, full backwages had been paid.

( 4 ) IT is the contention of the petitioner herein that proper seniority has not been given to the employees, full benefits have also been denied and there has been a deliberate non-compliance with the orders of the Tribunal. It is also contended that difference in salary has not been paid.

( 5 ) AS has already been noticed, this is an Award, which was passed under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. When this Act was, originally, framed, there was no provision relating to the execution of the Award. It is with the incorporation of Sec. 33c that specific provision has been made for recovery of money due from an employer under the Settlement, or an Award. The Supreme court has, on more than one occasion, dealt with the nature and scope of the provisions of Sec. 33c. In 1968 (1) LLJ 6, in the case of East India Coal company Limited v. Rameshwar, the Supreme Court took note of the decisions of that Court itself, relating to Sec. 33c (2), and then held that the following propositions on the question as to the scope of Sec. 33c (2) were deducible :-" (1) The legislative history indicates that the legislature, after providing broadly for the investigation and settlement of disputes on the basis of collective bargaining, recognized the need of individual workmen of a speedy remedy to enforce their existing individual rights and therefore, inserted Sec. 33a in 1950 and Sec. 33c in 1956. These two sections illustrate cases in which individual workmen can enforce their rights without having to take recourse to Sec. 10 (1) and without having to depend on their union to espouse their case. (2) In view of this history two considerations are relevant while construing the scope of Sec. 33c. Where industrial disputes arise between workmen acting collectively and their employers, such disputes must be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed by the Act, as for instance, under Sec. 10 (1 ). But, having regard to the legislative policy to provide a speedy remedy to individual workmen for enforcing their existing rights, it would not be reasonable to exclude their existing rights sought to be implemented by individual workmen. Therefore, though in determining the scope of Sec. 33c care should be taken not to exclude cases which legitimately fall within its purview, cases which fall, for instance under Sec. 10 (1), cannot be brought under Sec. 33c. (3) Sec. 33c which is in terms similar to those in Sec. 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, is a provision in the nature of an executing provision. (4) Sec. 33c (1) applies to cases where money is due to a workman under an award or settlement or under Chap. V-A of the Act already calculated and ascertained and therefore, there is no dispute about its computation. But sub-sec. (2) applies both to non-monetary as well