( 1 ) THE petitioner - appellant herein is the original plaintiff and the respondents are the original defendants in Special Civil Suit No. 247 of 1985 pending before the learned Civil Judge (S. D.), Junagadh, in which the appellantplaintiff has prayed for a decree of Rs. 69,730. 00 with interest and cost against the present respondent - defendants. The parties are, in this judgment, referred to herein as the plaintiff and defendants.

( 2 ) THE basis of the plaintiffs suit apparently is that Award which has been passed in M. A. C. No. 348 of 1982 filed before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Junagadh on 28th December 1983 has been obtained by practising fraud on the tribunal inasmuch as on the detailed facts set out in the plaint, the first defendant obtained false certificate for injuries and disablement from the second defendant and misled the Tribunal. In the suit before the learned Judge Issues were framed and the defendant No. 1 moved an application Ex. 83 to hear the issue regarding jurisdiction as preliminary issue. The learned trial Judge heard the said issue as preliminary issue and came to the conclusion that the trial Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the suit. Accordingly, he allowed application Ex. 83 and obviously put an end to the suit as per the impugned order dated 3-5-1993. It is this order which has been the subject matter of challenge in this Appeal from Order.

( 3 ) I have heard Miss. V. P. Shah, learned Advocate for the appellant and mr. Y. S. Lakhani, learned Advocate for the respondents.

( 4 ) THE provisions ousting the jurisdiction of Civil Court as contained in Motor vehicles Act have not only been quoted by the learned trial Judge in his detailed judgment, but have been read before me. Special jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Tribunal by virtue of Sec. 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act for the purpose of adjudicating upon the claim for compensation in respect of accident involving the death, or bodily injury to, persons arising out the user of motor vehicles, or damage to any property of a third party as arising or both, subject to proviso with regard to claim of compensation in respect of damage to the property with which we are not concerned presently. It can be seen from the averments contained in the suit the plaintiff does not seek restitution of the awarded amount. In fact, the plaintiff does not seek restitution of the awarded amount on any error committed by the Tribunal. Plaintiffs case is that in obtaining the award from the learned tribunal the defendant misrepresented the facts which ultimately resulted in passing of the award. There is no provision in the Motor Vehicles Act which provides for the Tribunal to set aside the award on the ground of fraud. The ouster of Civil courts jurisdiction as contained in Sec. 110 (F) of the Motor Vehicles Act is with regard to any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal.

( 5 ) THAT being the position of law flowing from the provisions of Motor Vehicles act, it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of Civil Court in a case like the present stands ousted either expressly or by necessary implication. The provision ousting the jurisdiction of Civil Court has to be construed strictly and that is the settled law. The normal rule of law is that Civil Courts have jurisdiction to try all Suits of a civil nature except those of which cognizance by them is either expressly or impliedly excluded. Sec. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure specifically speaks of jurisdiction of Civil Courts in all matters of civil nature. The suit to set aside a decree or an award passed consequent upon fraud or misrepresentation would necessarily be a suit if civil nature. In that view of the matter the decisions which have been cited on behalf of the respondent and referred to by the Tribunal would obviously have no application to the case like the present. 5a. In this view of the matter, it is