( 1 ) HOC basis in November, 1984. It was further clarified in the appointment order that her appointment was only upto 31st of July, 1985.

( 2 ) BEFORE 31st of July, 1985, the appellant filed a suit before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gondal and was successful in obtaining an interim injunction. After a period of 8 years, the suit was dismissed on 28th of April, 1993 and an appeal was filed. This appeal was dismissed and thereafter, the present writ petition has been filed which has been dismissed by the learned single Judge and against which the present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed.

( 3 ) IN our opinion, the Civil Court initially was wrong in granting an injunction in the year 1985, when the appointment of the appellant was for a fixed period only, i. e. , upto 31st July, 1985. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that in some other cases, relief has been granted, with or without the help of the Courts. Merely because wrong orders may have been passed in other cases can be no ground for allowing an illegality to be continued. The appointment of the appellant was, admittedly, for a fixed period, i. e. , upto 31st of July, 1985 and by ordering a status quo to be maintained, the civil Court has, in fact, extended the period of appointment beyond 31st of July, 1985, a jurisdiction which no Court can have. In matters like this, viz. , termination of service or suspension, it has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that interim injunction should not be readily granted. The principle behind this is very simple, viz. , that if the suit is dismissed, can restitution be ordered ? Obviously, if the period of appointment could not be extended beyond 31st of July, 1985, the question of any restitution being ordered with the vacation of injunction cannot arise. On the other hand, if injunction had been refused but ultimately, the plaintiff had succeeded, the Court would always order restitution, by awarding back wages, interest and promotions, in appropriate cases.

( 4 ) THE grant of an injunction under Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil procedure, 1908 has to be according to the known principles of law. Merely because hardship may be caused, cannot by itself be the sole ground for the Court to grant an injunction. There has to be a substantive right which requires protection and it is in those cases that an injunction should be granted. The Supreme Court in chandigarh Administration and Anr. v. Jagjit Singh and Anr. , JT 1995 (1) SC 445, has clearly stated that the mere fact that an authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be a ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the basis of discrimination. The same principle, in law, will apply even in a case, where another employee may have been successful in getting a judicial order which is contrary to established principles of law. The appellant is unable to satisfy this Court that she has any right to the post in question and the only right which is being claimed is founded on the basis of the injunction, which was granted and which allowed her to continue in service for 9 years.

( 5 ) LASTLY, reference is made to a single Judge judgment of this Court in the case Mukesh Pragjibhai Bhojani v. Director, Office of Rojgar and Talim Sanstha and anr. , 1992 (1) GLH 218. It is submitted by the learned Counsel that the present appellant was also selected in the manner in which Mr. Bhojani was selected. In bhojanis case, from the facts set out in the judgment, it appears that there were draft Recruitment Rules. In the advertisement, three essential qualifications were mentioned, one of them being that the candidate should have three years experience as a Gujarati Stenographer. It was also mentioned in the advertisement that if suitable candidates, with requisite three years experience were not available, then candidates having more than one years experience would be considere