( 1 ) ). [his Lordships after stating the facts of the case, further observed : ] xxx xxx xxx

( 2 ) ). Trial Court in the instant case appears to have overlooked the facts relevant for considering bail in non-bailable case. Question is, if such relevant facts are overlooked, would this Court not interfere with the order of bail and cancel it ? is it that, simply because the accused released on bail has not tried to interfere with in any manner with the administration of justice, this Court should permit to remain illegality? Despite rejection of relevant factors by the trial Court to grant bail, such bail order should not be interfered with ? Will this not amount to permit or condone arbitrary exercise of discretion conferred on the trial Court ? Is it that this Court cannot interfere with the order passed in total disregard of statutory provisions concerning bail ? Answer to all these questions, in my opinion, is that this Court can and should interfere with such bad orders. (Only a part of the Judgment approved for reporting is published.)

( 3 ) ). It will be relevant to state that the Forensic Science Laboratory has opined that the substance found is opium and is a narcotic substance. It is also relevant to state that respondent is alleged to be the tenant of the premises and his son was found present at the time of raid. In view of this fact, there are all the probabilities that he may be held guilty. Thus, there is a strong prima facie case. Keeping in view the minimum punishment of imprisonment as well as fine provided for the offence it can be said that in all probabilities the accused may abscond to avoid evil day and imprisonment or may indulge into such activity again to make good the fine that may be imposed if he is continued on bail.

( 4 ) ). In Dolatrams case, 1995 (1) SCC 349, the Court has said that bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial. However, when the question of cancellation of bail arose before the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Anand Chintaman dighe, reported in AIR 1991 SC 1603, the Court has held in paragraphs 8 and 9 as under :"8. The learned Judge further discussed the statements of witnesses recorded by the Investigating Officer. The Judge scrutinized the statements of Arun Jagtap, Smt. Sangita Khopkar and Miss Sujata Khopkar and treating those statements to be evidence before the Court, came to the conclusion that the statements could not be relied upon. The learned Judge virtually pre-empted the trial by delivering the judgment on the culpability of respondent Dighe. We are of the view that the learned Judge grossly erred in foreclosing the trial by prejuding the evidence which was yet to come on record. ""9. It is no doubt correct that this Court in its order dated January 16, 1990 observed that the cancellation of bail was without prejudice to the rights of Dighe to move the Designated Court for bail at any subsequent stage, but that was only in the event of any further evidence being recorded by the Court or any fresh material being made available during the investigation or before the Court. This court also directed that it was necessary for the Designated Court to consider further material collected by the investigating agency, by recording statements of witnesses. The Designated Court did not record any evidence and there was no fresh material available before the Court. The learned Judge, Designated Court, by putting his own gloss over the same material has again granted bail to the respondent. We do not appreciate the manner in which the learned Judge has dealt with the matter. The police investigation prima facie show that mafia-type terror and fear psychosis was created which led to the cold blooded murder of Shridhar Khopkar