( 1 ) ). THIS Special Civil Application under Art. 226 of the constitution of India has been filed seeking direction to quash the order dated 28- 10-1995 passed by the Addl. Development Commissioner, State of Gujarat, whereby he set aside the order passed by the respondent No. 2 District Development Officer, mehsana suspending the respondent No. 3 Akbarbhai Rahimbhai Momin from the office of Sarpanch under the provisions of Sec. 59 (1) of the Gujarat Panchayats act, 1993.

( 2 ) THE short facts of the case are that the petitioner lodged First Information report at Sidhpur Police Station on 20-2-1995 stating inter-alia that on the said day the respondent No. 3 alongwith about 7 persons arrived on the spot armed with dharia and other weapons and attacked on him and others. It is also stated that respondent No. 3 Sarpanch inflicted injuries on his person. On this information, the police registered a case against the respondent and others for offence under sec. 147, 148, 149, 324, 323, 504 and 506 (2) of I. P. C. As the respondent No. 3 was holding the office of Sarpanch, the proceeding under Sec. 59 (1) of the Gujarat panchayats Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") were initiated. After notice, the District Development Officer, Mehsana suspended the respondent No. 3 by order dated 18-9-1995. The suspended Sarpanch -respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal to the State Government against the said order. The appellate authority considering the facts of the case, nature of the offence and also having formed the opinion that Sarpanch was implicated on account of political rivalry set aside the order of the District Development Officer.

( 3 ) IT is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that there are serious allegations against the respondent No. 3 inasmuch as, that he attacked on the petitioner with deadly weapons like Dharia and caused hurt to him. This act of the respondent no. 3 on the facts of the case constitutes an offence of moral turpitude and as such the respondent No. 1 has exceeded jurisdiction in interfering with the order of the respondent No. 2 District Development Officer. The learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision of this Court reported in AIR 1996, Guj. 3 (Jorabhai Hirabhai Rabari v. D. D. O. , Mehsana ). I have gone through the judgment. This Court has held that whether an offence involves moral turpitude or not cannot always be judged in isolation and merely with reference to the ingredients of an offence. The learned Judge explaining the earlier decision of this Court in the case of Thakor Bhagabhai v. D. D. O. , Surat and Anr. , reported in 1980 (XXI) glr 966 observed thus :"therefore, the observations which have been made by the Honble Mr. Justice b. K. Mehta in Thakorbhai Bhagabha (supra) to the effect that it cannot be said that the alleged offences under Secs. 323, 324, 149, 147 and I. P. C. of Sec. 135 of the Bombay Police Act were offences involving moral turpitude in the sense that the alleged acts can be said to be a conduct which is contrary to honesty, good morals or unethical since at the most it was on incident of some scuffle between the petitioner and other persons alleged to be involved in the incident, are to be read in context of the facts of that case and did not lay down a strait-jacket formula that irrespective of the manner in which these offences are committed or against whom they are committed and the circumstances under which they are committed, i. e. , even without reference to the facts of the case they should be treated as offences involving moral turpitude". Thus, Sarpanch cannot be suspended just on institution of Criminal Case. Whether the act constitute an offence of moral turpitude, there cannot be a straitjacket formula. It depends on various factors including the manner and circumstances in which the offence alleged to have been committed. The rule of suspension of a person holding public office is based on a public p