1997 Supreme(Guj) 63
Gujarat High Court
Judgename :R.M.Doshit
KARODIBEN - Appellant
Versus
RAJUBHAI MAHENDRASINGH - Respondent
CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION 126 of 1992
Decided On : 01/24/1997
Headnote:Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Sec. 125(1)(d) - Expression Mother - Ambit & scope of - Refers only to a natural mother - Only exception carried out is in relation to a step-mother who has no child or whose husband has died or unable to maintain her - Otherwise `mother under the provision does not cover step-mother.
The expression `mother in Clause (d) of Sec. 125(1) of the Code means and is referable only to the real or natural mother who has actually given birth to the child. The Court, however, considering the benevolent purpose in enacting the above-referred Sec. 125 of the Code carved out an exception for the step-mother who does not have a child of her own and whose husband has either died or is unable to maintain her. Such step-mother can have a claim for maintenance against the step-sons. In the present case, it is undisputed that the petitioner has two sons. In my view, therefore, the above exception carved out by the Honble Supreme Court in the matter of Kirtikant D. Vadodaria (Supra) cannot be applied in favour of the petitioner No. 1. The petitioner No. 1 being a step-mother cannot claim benefit of maintenance against her step-sons under Sec. 125 of the Code.
[Para 3]
Key Points: - The expression "mother" in Sec. 125(1)(d) CrPC refers to the real or natural mother who has given birth to the child; exceptions exist for a step-mother who has no child and whose husband has died or is unable to maintain her (!) . - A step-mother cannot claim maintenance against her step-sons if she has two sons, i.e., the exception carved out in Kirtikant D. Vadodaria cannot be applied in the present case (!) . - Petitioner No. 1 (a step-mother) cannot benefit from Sec. 125 CrPC maintenance against her step-sons; the petition is dismissed and the rule discharged (!) . - The case references earlier judgments, including Havaben Karimbhai Belim v. Razakbhai and Ors., and discusses the benevolent purpose of Sec. 125 CrPC (!) . - The petitioners were mother and two minor sons seeking maintenance from the step-sons; the court examined whether maintenance could be claimed by a step-mother against her step-sons (!) (!) . - The petition filed under Sec. 125 CrPC was ultimately dismissed, with the Sessions Judge’s reversal upheld in the revision (!) (!) .
What is the ambit and scope of a "mother" under Section 125(1)(d) CrPC?
What is the status of a step-mother’s claim for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC when she has children or when the husband cannot maintain her?
What are the consequences of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kirtikant D. Vadodaria (Supra) for a step-mother’s maintenance claim against her step-sons?
( 1 ) THE petitioners herein are the mother and the two minor sons who have claimed maintenance under S. 125 of the Criminal Procedure code against the step-sons of the petitioner No. 1.
( 2 ) PETITIONERS preferred Criminal Misc. Application No. 199 of 1988 before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad, under S. 125 of the Code and claimed monthly maintenance of Rs. 500. 00 for each of them. Learned Metropolitan magistrate under his judgment and order dated 8th October, 1991 partially allowed the said application and awarded a monthly maintenance of Rs. 100. 00 to each of the petitioners. Feeling aggrieved, the respondent preferred Criminal Revision application No. 298 of 1991 before the learned Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad. The learned Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad, under his judgment and order dated 13-2-1992 allowed the application and quashed and set aside the judgment and order of the learned Magistrate. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners have preferred this revision application under S. 397 of the Code.
( 3 ) IT is undisputed that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein are the sons of the husband of the petitioner No. 1 by his first wife who is still alive. Petitioner No. 1 was the second wife of late Mahendrasingh and the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 are the minor sons of the late Mahendrasingh and the petitioner No. 1. The question that would, therefore, arise is whether the petitioner could have a claim for maintenance under S. 125 of the Code against her step-sons and whether the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 could have a claim for maintenance against their half brothers. This Court in earlier two judgments - one in the matter of Havaben Karimbhai Belim v. Razakbhai and Ors. , 1978 GLR 237 and in the matter of Aher Devsi Natha v. Rathiben nathubhai and Anr. , 1991 (2) GLR 1281 had held that the word mother used in s. 125 would also include the words step-mother and the step-mother should be entitled to claim maintenance from her step-sons. However, both these rulings have been overruled by the Honble Supreme Court in the matter of Kirtikant D. Vadodaria v. State of Gujarat and Anr. , 1996 (3) GLR 746 (SC ). The Court has held that the expression mother in clause (d) of S. 125 (1) of the Code means and is referable only to the real or natural mother who has actually given birth to the child. The Court, however, considering the benevolent purpose in enacting the abovereferred s. 125 of the Code carved out an exception for the step-mother who does not have a child of her own and whose husband has either died or is unable to maintain her. Such step-mother can have a claim for maintenance against the stepsons. In the present case, it is undisputed that the petitioner has two sons. In my view, therefore, the above exception carved out by the Honble Supreme Court in the matter of Kirtikant D. Vadodaria (supra) cannot be applied in favour of the petitioner No. 1. The petitioner No. 1 being a step-mother cannot claim benefit of maintenance against her step-sons under S. 125 of the Code. Learned Advocate mr. Bhatt has submitted that though the petitioner has two sons undisputedly both the sons were minor and were unable to maintain their mother, the petitioner No. 1. In the circumstances, the exception made for the childless step-mother should be extended to a step-mother who has minor children. I am afraid, I cannot accept the contention raised by Mr. Bhatt. The exception carved out by the Honble Supreme Court as aforesaid cannot be given further extended meaning. The claim for maintenance made by the petitioner No. 1 against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 is, therefore, required to be rejected. As far as the claim of the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 is concerned, they are the half brothers of respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Section 125 (1) entitles a wife to claim maintenance from her husband; a legitimate or illegitimate minor child to claim maintenance from the parent; a legitimate or illegitimate child not being a married daughter who