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1997 Supreme(Guj) 221

Gujarat High Court
Judgename :D.G.Karia
STATE OF GUJARAT - Appellant
Versus
URBAN LAND CEILING TRIBUNAL - Respondent
S.C.A. 215 of 1996
Decided On : 05/06/1997

Advocates Appeared: A.C.GANDHI, D.A.Bhambhania, S.I.NANAVATI

Headnote:Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 226 — Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 — Sec. 33 — Tribunal quashed the order of Competent Authority declaring that second respondent held more land than the ceiling limit prescribed under the Act — Petition challenged on ground of delay in filing the same on 8.1.1996 against order dated 17.9.1993 — No sufficient cause shown for the delay — On the contrary in the mean time land sold to third party creating third party interest — Held, considerable delay without any sufficient cause and in the meantime creating third party interest & construction of houses thereon are circumstances sufficient to dismiss petition — That apart there is merit to interfere with the order of Tribunal.

       The unexplained delay on the part of the petitioner coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which would weigh with the Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. In the instant case, there is considerable delay on the part of the petitioner in filing the petition and in the intervening period third respondent acquired the land, constructed houses thereon. These circumstances would be sufficient to dismiss the petition.

       [Para 5]

       What is contended is that the Tribunal should have remanded the matter if the Competent Authority failed to consider some of the documents showing that there was construction on the land. I see no merit in the submission as the Tribunal having examined the documents on record and having satisfied that the land in question cannot be said to be an open land in view of the construction thereon could very well pass the order quashing the order of Competent Authority.

       [Para 6]

       Important Point : Power under Art. 226 of Constitution is discretionary & High Court does not assist the tardy & indolent or acquiescent and the lethargic in its discretion.

D. G. KARIA, J.

( 1 ) THE State of Gujarat has questioned the legality and validity of the order passed by the Urban Land Tribunal and Ex-Officio Secretary, Revenue department, Gujarat State, Ahmedabad, on 17th September 1993 in Appeal No. Ahmedabad - 68 of 1993. By the impugned order, the Tribunal allowed the appeal under S. 33 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short "the act") and thereby quashed the order of the Competent Authority dated 23rd March 1993. The Competent Authority, by the said order, had held that the second respondent held more land than the ceiling limit prescribed under the Act.

( 2 ) THE relevant facts giving rise to the present petition is stated as follows :- the second respondent submitted a statement before the Competent Authority under the Act. The necessary notice under S. 8 (1) of the Act was thereafter issued and the draft statement as required under S. 8 (3) of the Act was served on the second respondent. By the order dated 17th July 1987 final statement as per the details set out in the order was ordered to be issued holding that the total land admeasuring 6,621 sq. mts. was surplus.

( 3 ) IN view of the aforesaid facts and position, the Competent Authority declared the land admeasuring 5,619. 98 sq. mts. as surplus land. The second respondent, therefore, filed appeal before the Urban Land Tribunal under S. 33 of the Act. By the order dated 8th June 1989, the Tribunal remanded the matter to the Competent authority for fresh decision after giving opportunity of being heard to the second respondent. The Competent Authority again passed the order on 30th April 1990 on which the Government reviewed the matter under S. 34 of the Act and remanded the matter to the Competent Authority as per the order dated 24th November 1992. The Competent Authority again passed the order dated 15th March 1993 declaring the land admeasuring 1,677. 23 sq. mts. as surplus land. The notice under S. 9 of the Act was, therefore, issued and final statement was received by the declarant on 14th May 1993.

( 4 ) THE second respondent, being aggrieved by the aforesaid order declaring the land surplus, preferred appeal under S. 33 of the Act. The Tribunal allowed the appeal on 17th September 1993 holding, inter alia, that the Competent Authority did not consider and appreciate the relevant documentary evidence on record showing that there was construction on the land in question and the constructed land of 764. 0 sq. mts. was not taken into consideration and as such the land cannot be said to be a vacant land within the meaning of S. 2 (g) of the Act. The State has preferred the present Special Civil Application on 8th January 1996 against the aforesaid judgment of the Tribunal pronounced on 17th September 1993.

( 5 ) THE preliminary objection raised on behalf of the second respondent is that there is inordinate delay in filing the petition on 8th January 1996 against the order dated 17th September 1993. There is no explanation indicating sufficient cause for filing the petition late. The second respondent sold the land to the third respondent somewhere in December 1994 and the possession of the land was handed over to the third respondent in January 1996. Thus, the equity has been created in favour of the third respondent during the pendency of the aforesaid petition which was preferred quite late. It is a settled law that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The present petition is barred by delay and laches. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be permitted to resort











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