( 1 ) ). Heard the learned Counsel for the appellant.

( 2 ) ). This is an appeal under Sec. 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the Act for short), challenging the order passed by the City Civil Court appointing a Sole Arbitrator to enter into arbitration for the resolution of the dispute, as nominated by respondent original-plaintiff.

( 3 ) ). The Supreme Court has laid down the principles to be kept in mind by a court dealing with Appeal From Orders under Order 43, Rule 1 and in this context, in the case of Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd. , reported at 1990 (Supp) SCC 727, and particularly in paragraphs 9 and 14 of the said decision, had occasion to observe that an appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. The Appellate Court will not re-assess the evidence independently, if the assessment of evidence and the conclusions thereon arrived at by the trial Court are reasonable. The above principle laid down by the Supreme Court has also been followed by the Supreme Court in the subsequent case of N. R. Dongre v. Whirlpool corpn. . reported at. 1996 (5) SCC 714.

( 4 ) I have no doubt that the said principle also applies to appeals under Sec. 37 of the said Act.

( 5 ) ). On the facts of the case I find that the trial Court has appreciated the evidentiary material on record on a prima facie basis in a reasonable manner, and that the findings of fact recorded and the conclusions drawn therefrom are just and reasonable.

( 6 ) ). However, a few salient points sought to be raised require to be noted. Learned counsel for the appellant first sought to contend that the original applicant had failed to produce the Arbitration Agreement as contemplated by sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 8 of the said Act. It was his contention that the application referred to in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 8 could not have been entertained by the Court unless it was "accompanied by the original Arbitration Agreement of a duly certified copy thereof. In this context, learned Counsel for the appellant has failed to take note of sub-secs. (2) and (5) of Sec. 7 of the said Act. Sub-sec. (2) specifically contemplates that an arbitration clause forming part of the contract between the parties is also to be construed as an arbitration agreement. Sub-sec. (5) contemplates that even if, within a contract, there is a reference to another document containing an arbitration clause, the same would also constitute an arbitration agreement if the contract is in writing, and the reference is such as to make that arbitration clause part of the contract. On the facts of the instant case, there is no dispute that clause 18 of the contract between the parties is an arbitration clause, and that the original applicant has in fact produced a copy of the contract. In fact, the copy produced by the applicant is the original so far as the applicant is concerned. This contention, therefore, has no merit.

( 7 ) ). Furthermore, the phrase "arbitration agreement" is defined in Sec. 2 (1 ) (b), and invokes the interpretation of Sec. 7, dealt with by me above.

( 8 ) ). Learned Counsel for the appellant then sought to contend that the application filed by the applicant under Secs. 8 and 9 of the said Act is incompetent by virtue of the fact that it was filed beyond the period of limitation, as contemplated by sec. 43 of the said Act. A plain perusal of Sec. 43 of the said Act indicates, vide sub-sec. (2), that for the purposes of this section and the Limitation Act, 1963, an arbitration shall be deemed to have commenced on the date referred to in Sec. 21. In this context. Sec. 21 merely contemplates that the arbitral proceedings in respect of a particular dispute commence on the date on which a request for that dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the respondent, unless otherwise agreed by The parties. On the facts of the case, it is found that Clause 18 of the contract, which constitutes the arbitration agreement; does not c