1999 Supreme(Guj) 334

Gujarat High Court
Judgename :Y.B.BHATT
MAGANLAL MEPABHAI PATEL - Appellant
Versus
COMPETENT AUTHORITY AND EX-OFFICIO ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR - Respondent
S.C.A. 8697 of 1997
Decided On : 07/20/1999

Headnote:(a) Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 — Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 — Sec. 4 — Abatement — Scope & applicability to orders passed by authorities under the Act 1976 — A plain reading of Sec. 4 clearly shows that it merely end all proceedings which relates to any order made or purported to be made under the Act of 1976 — Application made under Art. 226 of the Constitution to challenge the said rights would not make any difference — Court can exercise what ever jurisdiction it has under the article but shall have to remain bound by the parameters of the statutes — Contention that thus reading of the provision is inequitable is also not acceptable — Merely because remedy is cut short it can not be held that statute is inequitable — The abolition and repeal of the Act of 1976 only means that the machinery for enforcement of rights created by orders passed under that Act has ceased to exist — There is no dispute that present petition was pending on 30.3.1999, when the Repeal Act came into force & in view of provision under Sec. 4 of the Act 1999 it abates.

       On a plain reading of Sec. 4 it becomes obvious that the intention of the Parliament was merely to bring an end to all proceedings; all proceedings have obviously been clarified to mean those proceedings which relate to any order made or purported to be made under the principal Act. In short, therefore, and in plain language, where any orders were made or purported to be made under the Act of 1976, and where those orders were challenged by way of an appeal, revision or a writ petition, or perhaps even a suit (if permissible), such proceedings wherein such challenge was made would be proceedings for the re-examination of the rights of the parties. It is specifically these proceedings which have been directed to have abated, without reference to the rights of the parties which have been determined in the orders (being the subject matter of challenge in such proceedings). Thus, in my opinion, the very concept of abatement applies only to proceedings, i.e., to pending proceedings, and it is not rationally possible to read Sec. 4 with a view to analyse and dissect the rights crystallized in the orders which are the subject matter of the proceedings, merely with a view to examine what classes of rights would survive and what classes of rights would not.

       [Para 7]

       The fact remains that even while exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court can exercise whatever jurisdiction it has under this Article, while remaining bound by the parameters of the statute. In other words, even the High Courts jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, whether we call it a constitutional jurisdiction or a discretionary jurisdiction or a writ jurisdiction, is not beyond the statute. Thus, if Sec. 4 creates the mandate in respect of abatement of all pending proceedings, I am of the opinion that such mandate would apply even to the High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction under Art. 226. Even otherwise, the phrase before any Court, Tribunal, or other authority is sufficiently wide to indicate the intention of Parliament so as to cover all pending proceedings, irrespective of the forum where they were pending and irrespective of the nature of jurisdiction which that forum would be exercising.

       [Para 10]

       Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the provisions of Sec. 4 of the Repeal Act cannot be or should not be read in an inequitable manner, so as to lead to a conclusion that the right is saved, but remedy is lost. In my opinion, this is a trite submission, but without fundamental substance. The fundamentals of jurisprudence lay down that there is no right without a remedy. In other words, if there is no remedy (procedural), there is no right (absolute).

       [Para 11]

       Even if such a position can be considered to be inequitable, it is after all a reflection of the wisdom of the Legislature, and it is not for the Courts to go beyond or question such wisdom. When Sec. 4 is tested in the context of this submission, the only conclusion which can be drawn is that it was the intention of the Legislature to cut short all pending proceedings which arose from orders made under the Act of 1976. This intention is both firm and clear on a plain reading of Sec. 4. It would, therefore, be incongruous to accept such a submission and to hold that because the remedy is cut short (by saving the rights created by the impugned orders), the statute is inequitable and therefore requires to be re-read or reinterpreted.

       [Para 12]

       The intention of the Legislature in enacting the Repeal Act of 1999 is reflected firstly in Sec. 2 thereof, whereby the Act of 1976 is repealed, and is reflected in Sec. 4 whereby all pending proceedings have been declared to have abated. If the Repeal Act of 1999 does not choose to deal with the so-called rights created by orders passed under the Act of 1976, it does not necessarily mean that those rights are left in limbo, or that they cease to exist as rights. The abolition and repeal of the Act of 1976 only mean that the machinery for enforcement of rights created by orders passed under that Act has ceased to exist.

       [Para 15]

       (b) Principle of equity — Applicability — Principle is not applicable in the scheme of interpretation of statutes — Only exception can be in a case where a number of interpretations are possible & a given interpretation leads to inequity — There also the intention of legislature is relevant.

       Even otherwise, equity has no place in the scheme of interpretation of statutes. The only possible exception may be where a number of interpretations are possible, and a given interpretation leads to inequity. Even in the latter case, it is not the equities between the parties that is relevant, but only the intention of the Legislature.

       [Para 13]