D. C. SRIVASTAVA, J.

( 1 ) THE appellant moved an application under Sections 8, 9 and 20 of the Indian Arbitration Act in the Court below requesting for appointment of Arbitrator within the terms of the tender agreement and contending that the dispute arose between the parties in respect of tender Agreement the same may be referred to the Arbitrator appointed by the Court for adjudication of disputes. As usual this Application was registered as Special Suit No. 66 of 1988. Written statement was entertained by the Court below. Issues were framed. No evidence was given by the plaintiff appellant. Certain documents were filed which were exhibited. Ultimately the court below did not propose to decide Issues No. 4 and 5. Issues No. 1 and 2 were decided in negative. The trial Court further found that since existence of dispute between the parties is not proved the plaintiff is not entitled to get Arbitrator appointed under clause : 35 of the tender Agreement. With these findings the Suit was dismissed on 30. 7. 1996 by Civil Judge (S. D.), Palanpur. This Judgment and order of the Court below is under challenge in this Appeal.

( 2 ) SHRI H. K. Parmar for the appellant and Shri S. A. Desai for the respondents have been heard.

( 3 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellant has contended that in view of enforcement of Gujarat Public Works Contract Dispute Arbitration Tribunal Act, 1992 with effect from 1. 1. 1994 the Judgment and Decree of the Court below dated 30. 7. 1996 is totally without jurisdiction and consequently is nulity which is liable to be set aside in this Appeal. Certain provisions of the Gujarat Public Works Contract Dispute Arbitration Tribunal Act, 1992 (for short "the Act") were pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant in support of his contention and also the provisionsof the Gujarat Agricultural University Act, 1969 (for short "university Act" ). As against this the contention of Shri Desai, learned Counsel for the respondent has been that no interference in the Judgment and Decree of the trial court is required. His contention has been that the respondent is not a Corporation within the meaning of Section 2 (i) (ii) of the Act. He has also tried to distinguish the concept of Corporation as enunciated by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Sardar Patel University v/s. Patel and Co. , reported in 1998 (2) G. L. H. 41.

( 4 ) CERTAIN facts are not in dispute before us. It is not disputed that it was work contract which was assigned to the appellant. Section 2 (k) of the Act defines "works contract" which means a contract made by the State Government or the public undertaking with any other person for the execution of any of its works relating to construction, repairs or maintenance of any building or superstructure, dam, weir, canal, reservoir, tank lake, road, well, bridge, culvert, factory or workshop or of such other work of the State Government or, as the case may be, of the public undertaking, as the State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette specify and includes any contract mentioned in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 2 (k) of the Act. Since it is not in dispute that the contract between the parties was works contract within the meaning of Section 2 (k) of the Act the next question is whether the Judgment and Decree of the Court below is nulity and without jurisdiction. Obviously the Judgment was rendered on 30. 7. 1996 whereas the Act came into operation with effect from 1. 1. 1994. It is thus manifest that the Judgment was rendered after enforcement of the Act. As such Section 13 of the Act can safely be pressed in service which provides for bar of jurisdiction of courts. It provides that save as otherwise provided by Section 12, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to deal with or decide any question which the Tribunal is empowered to deal with and decide by or under this act and no injunction shall be granted by any Civil Court in respect of any action taken or to be taken

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