( 1 ) THIS is a revision application under Sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act at the instance of the legal heir of the original tenant (who died during the pendency of the appeal before the lower Appellate Court), challenging the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the lower Appellate Court. The respondent-landlord had sued the defendant-tenant for a decree of eviction on the ground that he had unlawfully sublet the suit premises and that he was, therefore, entitled to a decree of eviction under sec. 13 (1) (e) of the Bombay Rent Act. The Trial Court, after appreciating the evidence on record, found in favour of the plaintiff-landlord and passed a decree for eviction. The defendant-tenant preferred an appeal under Sec. 29 (1) of the said Act before the lower appellate Court. The lower Appellate Court, after reappreciating the entire evidence on record, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decree of eviction passed by the Trial court. Hence the present revision at the instance of the heirs of the original defendant-tenant.

( 2 ) BEFORE proceeding with the merits of the matter it would be pertinent to bear in mind the principles laid down by the Supreme Court while dealing with the revisions arising under Sec. 29 (2) of the said Act. The Supreme Court in the case of Patel Valmik himatlal and Ors. vs. Patel Mohanlal Muljibhai, [1998 (2) GLH 736 = AIR 1998 SC 3325], while approving and reiterating the principles laid down in its earlier decision in the case of Helper Girdharbhai vs. Saiyad Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri [air 1987 SC 1782], held that High Court cannot function as a Court of appeal, cannot reappreciate the evidence on record, cannot discard concurrent findings of fact based on evidence recorded by the Courts below, and cannot interfere on grounds of inadequacy or insufficiency of evidence, and cannot interfere, except in cases where conclusions drawn by the Courts below are on the basis of no evidence at all, or are perverse. A different interpretation on facts is also not possible merely because another view on the same set of facts may just be possible.

( 3 ) ONLY a few salient features require to be noted. The landlord had contended in the suit that he had rented out the suit premises for business purposes to the first defendant-original tenant, who utilised the premises for conducting his business. However, in or about the end of 1972 or early 1973 the first- defendant original tenant gave up his business, and transferred possession of the suit premises to his son who started a new business in the suit premises. According to the landlord, therefore, this amounted to unlawful transfer of his interest in the suit premises and therefore the landlord is entitled to a decree for eviction.

( 4 ) IT requires to be noted that the son who was alleged to have been the sub-tenant was joined in suit as defendant No. 2. The defence of the two defendants was general in nature, the contentions being restricted to denials, and a general assertion that the father and son were doing business in the suit premises "while sitting together". It is pertinent to note that neither in the written statement nor during the course of evidence has either defendant put up a specific case that they were joint in the business when the first defendant started his business in the rented premises on taking the came on rent. 4. 1 It was only during the course of tenants appeal that a case was put up that the first defendant-tenant and the second defendant son were partners in the said business. An application was given during the course of the appeal at Exh. 17 where a prayer was made for production of a document purporting to be a certified copy of an extract from the registrar of Firms which purported to show the first defendant and the second defendant as partners on 18th April, 1970. It is also pertinent to note that the said application was granted i. e. , production was permitted. However, it is well under