2002 Supreme(Guj) 219
Gujarat High Court
Judgename :SHARAD D.DAVE, Y.B.BHATT
SITABEN - Appellant
Versus
BHANABHAI MADARIBHAI PATEL - Respondent
First Appeal 1967 of 1999
Decided On : 03/20/2002
Headnote:Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908) — Sec. 96 — Appeal against dismissal of suit for partition of ancestral property by metes and bounds including agricultural land among sister the plaintiff and brother the respondent — Court found that what is alleged for partition by plaintiff is ancestral property — Plaintiff has not sued for joint possession with defendant brother in respect of such ancestral property but has in fact sued for partition and delivery of 1/2 share in the property in question — Plaintiff only claims member of HUF and not a coparcener and, therefore, cannot maintain an action for partition of HUF property — There are the fundamentals of the Hindu Law — That apart it is the plaintiffs own case that she was married 26 years prior to the suit — It is well settled that on the marriage of a female she ceases to be a member of her fathers HUF and becomes member in her husbands HUF — Obviously, therefore, the plaintiff has no interest or share in the property of her fathers HUF on the date of the suit — Court below, therefore, rightly dismissed her suit and there is no substance in appeal.
What requires to be noted in that the plaintiff has not sued merely for a declaration of a share in what is alleged to be ancestral property, and she has not sued for joint possession with the defendant brother in respect of such ancestral property. What she has in fact sued for is for partition of the property by metes and bounds and possession and delivery of her 1/2 share in the lands in question.
[Para 6]
The fundamental question which arises is as to whether a female who is only a member of a HUF, and not a coparcener, can sue for partition by metes and bounds. The answer is clearly in the negative. These are the fundamentals of the Hindu Law and do not require any elaborate discussion. However, reference may be made to Mullas Principles of Hindu Law (17th Edition), Arts. 307, 315, 316, 317 and 333 (3).
[Para 6.1]
It is also pertinent to note that plaintiff has not filed the suit as heir of her father Madaribhai, so as to claim a share in the interest of Madaribhai in his HUF. What the plaintiff has sued for is not her fathers share in the HUF, but she has sued for the partition of the entire HUF properties held by Madaribhai as karta of the HUF. Obviously, on these facts and under such circumstances, Sec. 6 of the Hindu Succession Act would not be applicable, which deals only with the devolution of the interest of a coparcenary in HUF property under intestate succession.
[Para 7]
Even otherwise, it is the plaintiffs own case that she was married 26 years prior to the suit. It is well settled that, on the marriage of a female, she ceases to be a member of her fathers HUF, and becomes a member in her husbands HUF. Obviously, therefore, the plaintiff had no interest or share in the property of her fathers HUF on the date of the suit.
[Para 8]
( 1 ) ). THIS is an appeal by the original plaintiff challenging the dismissal of her suit by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Surat by judgment and decree in Special Civil Suit No. 89/97.
( 2 ) ). IT is pertinent to note that the plaintiff is a female and she has filed suit in her capacity as daughter of one Madaribhai Bhagabhai Dhodiya, although it is admitted that she is married. She had sued her brother for partition of ancestral property by metes and bounds, where agricultural lands were the subject matter of this partition suit.
( 3 ) ). THE Trial Court after framing appropriate issues on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, considered the entire evidentiary material on record and came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is not entitled to 1/2 share of the suit property as claimed, that the plaintiff failed to prove that the properties which were the subject matter of the suit were joint family properties, that the plaintiff is not entitled to the partition claimed, and that the defendant has proved that the plaintiff has no right title or interest in the suit property.
( 4 ) ). THE learned counsel for the appellant has sought to contend before us that the findings recorded by the Trial Court are erroneous in the light of the evidentiary material on record. We have not examined these contentions pertaining to the appreciation of evidence on record in as much as we are of the opinion that the suit suffers from a fundamental defect and that the plaintiff has no right to sue for the reliefs claimed in the suit.
( 5 ) ). IT is the plaintiffs own case that she is the daughter and that the defendant is the son of their common father Madaribhai. It is the plaintiffs own case that the agricultural land which are the subject matter of the suit are ancestral property. It is the plaintiffs own case that she is entitled to 1/2 share in the said property. On the basis of these averments and assertion in the plaint, she has sued for partition of the said property by metes and bounds.
( 6 ) ). WHAT requires to be noted is that the plaintiff has not sued merely for a declaration of a share in what is alleged to be ancestral property, and she has not sued for joint possession with the defendant brother in respect of such ancestral property. What she has in fact sued for is for partition of the property by metes and bounds and possession and delivery of her 1/2 share in the lands in question. 6. 1. THE fundamental question which arises is as to whether a female who is only a member of a H. U. F. , and not a coparcener, can sue for partition by metes and bounds. The answer is clearly in the negative. These are the fundamentals of the Hindu Law and do not require any elaborate discussion. However, reference may be made to Mullas Principles of Hindu Law (17th Edition), Articles 307, 315, 316, 317 and 333 (3 ). 6. 2. LEARNED counsel for the appellant has sought to contend that the General Hindu Law stands abolished and or repealed inasmuch as the Parliament has enacted specific Acts dealing with various aspects of Hindu Law. He refers to such Acts as Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and Hindu Succession Act, 1956. There cannot be any doubt that where the parliament has enacted specific Acts on specific subjects, which formerly formed part of the General Hindu Law, the specific provisions of these specific Acts will override the principles laid down in General Hindu Law to that extent. However, by no stretch of imagination can it be suggested that the General Hindu Law stands abolished as a whole and or repealed only on account of enactment of these specific and particular Acts dealing with only certain aspects of Hindu Law. 6. 3. LEARNED counsel for the appellant sought to rely upon Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and in this context learned counsel contended that only the right of a female heir to claim partition in respect of