ORDER :- In Criminal Case No. 529 of 1967 in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Harij, the applicant-accused came to be convicted for offences under Sections 304-A and 279 of the Indian Penal Code. While he was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, or, in default, to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for one month for an offence under Sec. 304-A, he was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 15 days and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/-, or, in default, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven days for an offence under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code. He was, besides, convicted for an offence under Sec. 116 read with Section 112 of the Motor Vehicles Act and no separate sentence was passed for the same. Against that order passed on 24th July 1968 by Mr. J. S. Dasondi, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Harij, the accused filed Criminal Appeal No. 97 of 1968 in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Mehsana, who, confirming the same, dismissed the appeal. Feeling dissatisfied with that order passed on 14-11-1968 by Mr. K. M. Satwani, Sessios Judge, Mehsana, the accused has come in revision before this Court.

2. The Courts below have considered the effect of the evidence adduced in the case and the conclusions reached by them are perfectly proper. The learned Sessions Judge has dealt with every point raised before him and after carefully appreciating the evidence and the circumstances disclosed therein, has rightly upheld the order of conviction passed against the accused in the case.

3. The only point made out by Mr. Shah, the learned advocate for the applicant-accused, however, is that a separate order of conviction and sentence passed against the accused for an offence under Section 279 is neither legal nor proper and that it is liable to be set aside. He invited a reference to a decision in the case of Shiva Ram v. State, AIR 1965 All 196 where it was held that the offences defined by Sections 279 and 280 and 336 and 337 and 338 could be viewed as minor offences included within Section 304-A, I. P. C., and the Court would not be justified in convicting the accused for an offence under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code when he has been convicted for the offence under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code which includes the lesser offence. Then in the alternative, he urged that a separate sentence for an offence under Section 279 cannot be passed in view of Section 71 of the Indian Penal Code, and for that he sought support from the unreported decision of mine in Criminal Appeal No. 946 of 1964, D/- 28-2-1966 (Guj) where on a similar point raised it was held that since the offence under Section 279 is covered in the larger offence for which he is held liable i.e. under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, no separate sentence for the offence under Section 279 is passed.

4. Now the offence under Section 279 is obviously a distinct offence much though it may be a minor offence in relation to the offences under Ss. 337, 338 or 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. The mere fact that it happens to be a minor offence, it does not cease to be one having independent character, and it is for this reason that while he may well be convicted for the same, the Court has to take into account Section 71 of the Indian Penal Code while passing sentence for the same. Section 71 of the Indian Penal Code is obviously intended for such purposes so that if he is also found guilty for a greater offence, he cannot be given separate sentence for a minor one covered therein. All that is required is that the offence for which he is sentenced is committed in the same transaction. This view of mine finds support from the decision in the case of State v. Gulam Meer, AIR 1956 Madh Bha 141 (FB), where the Full Bench of that High Court held as under :-

"An offence under Section 279 is distinct from an offence under Section 337 or Section 338 and, therefore, a person convicted of an offence

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