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1968 Supreme(Guj) 38

Gujarat High Court
N. K. VAKIL
State of Gujarat - Appellant
Versus
Pagi Bhurabhai Rumalbhai - Respondent
Second Appeal No. 387 of 1965
Decided On : 03/27/1968

Advocates:
G.M. Vidyarthi, Asst. Govt. Pleader, for Appellant; S.B. Majumdar, for Respondent.

Headnote:

Administrative Act - Statutory right of appeal - Authority in disposing appeal must be deemed to be acting judicially - Quasi-judicial functions - Minimum standards that should obtain in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and this includes important right and privilege to appellant to be heard in support of his appeal - Now it is here that with due respect I differ from Judges – Held, next authority on which reliance was tried to be placed State but in this case also there is nothing which directly helps the respondent - Remark particularly relied is that rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing applies alike to Judicial tribunals and bodies persons invested with authority to adjudicate matters involving civil consequences - It is one fundamental rules our constitutional set up that every citizen is protected against exercise arbitrary authority by State or its officers - Duty to act judicially would therefore arise from very nature function intended to be performed it need not be shown to be superadded - If there is power to decide and determine to prejudice a person duty to act judicially is implicit in exercise of such power - If essentials justice be ignored and an order to prejudice person is made order is a nullity – Appeal allowed

JUDGMENT : The only point involved in this second appeal is whether reasonable opportunity to be given to a Government Servant under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution in a Departmental Inquiry includes a right of personal hearing at the stage of appeal.

2. The respondent had joined the Police Department on 18th of April 1945 and, at the relevant date, he was working as a Police Head Constable. He was charged with criminal trespass into the compound of the P. S. I. Dohad (Rural) on the night between the 25th and 26th of November 1959. Thereafter a preliminary inquiry was held and subsequently a departmental inquiry was held as a result of which the plaintiff was dismissed from service by the Order of the D. S. P. dated 22nd of July 1960. The respondent then filed an appeal before the D. I. G. and it is the case of the respondent that he had requested the D. I. G. to give a personal hearing to him but that request was rejected by the D. I. G. and the appeal was dismissed on the 31st of December 1960. The plaintiff then approached the Inspector General of Police by filing a revision application which was also dismissed. He then approached the Government of Gujarat with another revision application which also met with the same fate. The respondent then filed Regular Civil Suit No. 96 of 1953 in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge at Godhra. He filed the suit for a declaration that the order passed by the D. S. P., Godhra, dated 22nd July 1960 dismissing him from service was illegal and ultra vires. The main ground on which this declaration was sought was that he was not given a personal hearing at the stage of appeal and, therefore, he was not given a reasonable opportunity as is contemplated by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and, therefore, the order is bad. The main contention on behalf of the defendant was that the respondent was not entitled to any personal hearing at the appellate stage before the D. I. G. The trial Court decreed the suit. The State of Gujarat, therefore, approached the District Court at Godhra, the appeal being Appeal No. 361 of 1964 and the learned Assistant Judge who heard the appeal, confirmed the decree of the original Court, holding that a personal hearing is the necessary requirement of the concept of reasonable opportunity to be given under Article 311 (2) at the stage of hearing of appeal also. It may be mentioned that the learned appellate Judge solely relied upon the decision in AIR 1963 Assam 183, Dharani Mohan v. State of Assam and did not accept the contention of the State that the said ruling could not be considered to be good law in the face of the Supreme Court decision in AIR 1960 SC 493, Kapur Singh v. Union of India.

3. Now, so far as the departmental proceedings are concerned, there is no dispute that the respondent was given a reasonable opportunity both at the first stage of the inquiry and also the second stage of the inquiry when the punishment was meted out and his only contention is that the order dismissing him is bad in law as he was not given a personal hearing though he demanded it, by the D. I. G. who heard his appeal. The learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Vidyarthi submitted that the first appellate Court was wrong in holding that in case of dismissal of a Government Servant, he is entitled to a personal hearing even at the stage of appeal, by relying upon the decision of AIR 1963 Assam 183 (supra). He urged that the relevant observations in the decision of the Supreme Court were not properly appreciated. He argued that reasonable opportunity of showing cause required to be given under Article 311 (2) did not necessitate a personal hearing at the stage of appeal. In order to support his submission, some rulings were cited to which I shall advert a little later.

4. Mr. S. B. Majumdar, the learned advocate for the respondent, supported the finding and the judgment of the appellate Court. He argued that there is no decision of any High Court or the Supreme Court whi






















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