Jayant Patel, J.

1. As in all the appeals common question arises for consideration and the judgment was also common, they are being considered by this common order.

2. All the First Appeals arise from the common judgment and decree dated 30th September, 1994 passed by the learned City Civil Judge in Civil Suit Nos. 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2470 and 3006 of 1976, whereby the learned City Civil Judge has decreed the suits in favour of the Plaintiffs-Appellants herein. However, on the aspects of interest, the trial Court has awarded 6% p.a., from the respective date until the amount is realized and not 14% p.a., as claimed by the Appellants-Plaintiffs. Hence, the present appeals.

3. We have heard Mr. Dave with Mr. Jani, learned Counsel for the Appellants. Ms. Davawala, learned Counsel has appeared for Respondent No. 5 in First Appeals No. 5144, 5145, and 5148 of 1995.

4. As such on the aspects of factum of filing of the suits, leading of the evidence by both the sides, consideration of the matter by the learned Judge and passing of the judgment and decree, are not much in dispute, nor such a ground is under challenge in the present appeals, save and except on the aspects of liability to pay interest and, if yes, the entitlement of the rate of interest, hence, we find that it would not be necessary to deal with the facts elaborately and we may rather concentrate on the question and the relevant evidence in context in contention raised before us by the Appellant.

5. It may also be recorded that the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant in all the matters has contended the only question of non-awarding of interest at the rate of 14% by the trial Court and awarding of only 6% of the interest and it was submitted that the other part of the judgment and decree of the trial Court are not under challenge.

6. The contention raised on behalf of the Appellant is that though found and considered by the learned Judge of the trail Court, after drawing of the instrument, the communication was made by the Appellant Bank to the party concerned that if the instrument is not honoured or the payment is not made as per the instrument, interest at the rate of 14% per annum would be charged from the due date of payment. The learned Counsel submitted that the trial Court ought not to have discarded that part of the evidence and could have considered the same as a valid piece of evidence binding to both the sides and more particularly the Defendant therein and the interest as per the terms and conditions of the contract was required to be awarded at the rate of 14% per annum. It was alternatively submitted that Section 80 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act;) was also amended w.e.f. 30.12.1988 and the interest provided was 18% per annum, whereas the learned Judge has proceeded on the basis of 6% per annum. He submitted that when the statute was already amended on the date when the judgment and decree was passed, the Court ought to have considered that part and the interest was required to be awarded at the rate of 14% p.a., as agreed or alternatively it could also be 18% p.a. He submitted that, therefore, the aspect of awarding of interest at the rate of 6% p.a., is erroneous and the appeals deserve to be allowed to that extent.

7. It deserves to be recorded that the learned Advocate for the Appellant has not been able to show any admission of interest at the rate of 14% p.a., by the concerned Defendants by way of pleading in the record of the trial Court. Therefore, in absence of any admission by the Defendants concerned on the aspect of quantum of interest at the rate of 14% per annum, if the learned Judge has proceeded to examine the evidentiary value the documents of the instrument and the communication thereafter between the parties, the same cannot be said as erroneous.

8. Further, the pertinent aspect is that it is not the case of the Appellant-Plaintiff also that any rate of interest was specified in the