1. The challenge in this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, is to the order of the Collector, Vadodara, dated 29/08/1998, whereby the order of the Deputy Collector, Vadodara, dated 07/10/1996, has been quashed and set aside and Revenue Entry No.685 made on the basis of the Sale Deed for the land in question, has been cancelled and the land has been forfeited to the State Government without encumbrances.

2. The factual background of the matter is that, the petitioner purchased land comprising Block No.72, admeasuring 2 Acres and 1 Guntha, situated in Village Khanpur, Taluka and District Vadodara, by a Sale Deed executed on 15/04/1988, and registered on 24/01/1989, from respondent No.4, for a consideration of Rs.28,000/-. On the basis of the Sale Deed, entry No.685 was mutated in the revenue record on 09/01/1990, in favour of the petitioner, which was confirmed by the Mamlatdar on 12/02/1990. After a period of four years, much beyond the period of limitation of 60 days as prescribed in Rule 108(5) of the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules, 1972, (“The Rules” for short) respondent No.4,the original land owner, challenged Revenue Entry No.685 by filing an appeal, commonly known as an R.T.S. Appeal before the Deputy Collector. By order dated 07/10/1996, the said appeal was rejected on the ground of delay. Carrying the matter further, the original land owner filed an appeal against the order of the Deputy Collector, to the Collector. By the impugned order dated 29/08/1998, the Collector set aside the order of the Deputy Collector, cancelled Entry No.685, and directed the land to be forfeited to the State Government, on the ground that the sale transaction entered into by the petitioner and respondent No.4, is violative of the provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 (“the Fragmentation Act',for short). Aggrieved by the above-mentioned order of the Collector, the petitioner is before this Court.

3. Mr.Shalin N.Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioner has made detailed submissions, the crux of which is briefly summarised as below:

1. That the appeal filed by respondent No.4 is not competent as it has been filed after a period of four years, whereas the period of limitation prescribed in Rule 108(5) is 60 days. The Deputy Collector has rightly rejected the appeal on the ground of delay. However, the Collector has set aside the order of the Deputy Collector on legally unsustainable grounds.

2. That respondent No.4, who is the seller, has no locus standi to file the appeal. Having pocketed the sale consideration, and being a willing party to the Sale Deed, he cannot now contend that he is an aggrieved party and that the Sale Deed has been obtained by undue influence, inducement, or that there is a violation of the provisions of the Fragmentation Act. The Sale Deed has been executed on 15/04/1988, and registered on 24/01/1989. It was for the first time on 17/06/1994, that respondent No.4 raised the dispute, having remained silent for four to five years. Conduct such as that of respondent No.4 has been deprecated in several judicial pronouncements. Respondent No.4 cannot be termed to be a “person aggrieved” so as to raise a dispute and cannot try to take advantage of his own wrong.

3. That the Collector, who was deciding an appeal under Rule 108(6), had no authority in law to examine the validity, or otherwise, of the Sale Deed, while exercising power under the Rules. Moreover, the question whether the Sale Deed is violative of the provisions of the Fragmentation Act, or not, is not one that can be decided in RTS proceedings. It is now a settled principle of law that revenue authorities cannot pass orders of cancelling the entries on an assumption that the transaction recorded in the entry is against the provisions of another enactment. While deciding an RTS appeal under the Rules, the Collector could not have cancelled Entry No.685 evidencing the sale of l