[1.0] Present Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "CPC") has been preferred by the appellants herein - original defendants to quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 19.10.2004 passed by the learned Appellate Court - learned Joint District Judge & 9th Fast Track Court, Nadiad in Regular Civil Appeal No.27 of 2003 by which the learned Appellate Court has dismissed the said Appeal preferred by the appellants herein - original defendants confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court passing the decree for redemption of the mortgage with respect to the suit properties.

[2.0] That the respondent - original plaintiff instituted the Regular Civil Suit No.81 of 1999 against the appellants herein – original defendants in the Court of learned 3rd Joint Civil Judge (S.D.), Nadiad for redemption of mortgage of suit house and open land and for its possession against the appellants herein and the learned trial Judge decreed the suit of the original plaintiff – respondent herein.

[2.1] That being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court dated 25.03.2003 passed in Regular Civil Suit No.81 of 1999, original defendants preferred Regular Civil Appeal No.27 of 2003 before the learned District Court, Nadiad, and by impugned judgment and order dated 19.10.2004, the learned Appellate Court – learned Joint District Judge, 9th Fast Track Court, Nadiad has dismissed the said Appeal confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court dismissing the suit.

[2.2] Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order/decree passed by both the Courts below more particularly the judgment and order passed by the learned Appellate Court dismissing the Appeal confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, without re-appreciation of evidence on record and without giving any specific findings on those issues and without even raising the point for determination as required under Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC, the original plaintiff has preferred the present Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC.

[3.0] At the outset it is required to be noted that while admitting the present Second Appeal, the learned Single Judge has framed the following substantial question of law.

Whether the judgment of the First Appellate Court is a judgment in the eye of law in view of the fact that no reasons are assigned for confirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court?

[4.0] Having heard Shri Adeshra, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants and Shri Bukhari, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent and considering the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Appellate Court it appears to the Court that the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Appellate Court cannot be sustained. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Appellate Court it appears that the learned Appellate Court has disposed of the Appeal preferred under Order 41 of the CPC read with Section 96 in a most casual and perfunctory manner. Apart from the fact that the learned Appellate Court has not framed the points for determination as required under Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC, it appears that even the learned Appellate Court has not exercised the powers vested in it as a first Appellate Court. Learned Appellate Court has neither re-appreciated the entire evidence on record nor has given any specific findings on the issues which were even raised before the learned trial Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of B.V. Nagesh and Anr. vs. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy reported in (2010)13 SCC 530, in para 4 has observed and held as under:

“4. The appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse/affirm the findings of the trial Court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case therein is open for re-he