1. As per the order passed by this court in Miscellaneous Civil Application No.2592 of 2012, since the present petition is restored, the same is to be further considered.

2. The petitioners of this petition have challenged the legality and validity of the of the order passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, dated 04.10.1996, whereby the Tribunal has restored the order of the Mamlatdar on the point of limitation and has set aside the order of the Deputy Collector.

3. The short facts are that the original petitioner preferred an application under Section-70(b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948(hereinafter referred to as 'The Act'), and prayed that it may be declared by the Mamlatdar that the respondents before him are not the tenants of the land in question. Mamlatdar initiated the proceedings and ultimately vide order dated 31.01.1991, held that the cause of action for the Suit arose in the year 1988 and the present Suit is filed on 07.03.1990, and therefore, the Suit being outside the limitation, the same was dismissed.

4. The matter was carried in appeal by the petitioner and the Deputy Collector vide order dated 31.08.1991 allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Mamlatdar and he also held that the original defendants before the Mamlatdar are not the tenants of the land.

5. The matter was further carried in Revision by respondent Nos.1 and 2 and in the revision the Tribunal, as per the impugned order dated 04.10.1996, set aside the order of the Deputy Collector and maintained the order of the Mamlatdar and further directed to proceed in accordance with law for consideration of the case of deemed tenancy. It is under these circumstances, the petitioner has approached this Court by the present petition.

6. I have heard Mr. Jadeja, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, Mr. R.M. Shah, learned Counsel for respondent No.1, Mr. Jitendra M. Patel, learned Counsel for respondent No.2 and Ms. Moxa Thakkar, learned AGP for respondent No.3.

7. As such the whole issue before the lower authorities namely Deputy Collector as well as before the Revenue Authority was as to whether Mamlatdar was justified in dismissing the application on the ground of bar of limitation or not? When one uses the word “Limitation”, it is to be understood that the limitation period must have been expressly provided by the statute. Otherwise, if the application is to be dismissed on the ground of delay, the different considerations prevail, including the question of creation of equity by the parties or not. The initial order passed by the Mamlatdar is that the suit is not filed within the period of six months, as provided under the Mamlatdar Courts Act, and therefore, the suit is barred by the limitation. When the matter was further carried before the Deputy Collector, it was required that by the Deputy Collector to only examine, as to whether exercise of power for dismissal of the application on the ground of limitation was appropriate or not? But, it appears that the Deputy Collector also exceeded the jurisdiction vested in him by further examining the matter on merits of the case, as to whether the deemed tenancy or contractual tenancy would be applicable, keeping in view the relations of the parties or not? Similar situation, further, continued before the Tribunal in revisional proceedings, inasmuch as the Tribunal proceeded to examine the legality and validity, as observations made by the Deputy Collector on merits of the case are even otherwise also were exceeding the appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal practically concluded the issue that deemed tenancy would apply and it also exceeded the jurisdiction by directing the Mamlatdar to consider the case in accordance with law, on the premise that there is deemed tenancy.

8. It is hardly required to be stated that the scope or the jurisdiction of the appellate authority i.e. Deputy Collector and also of the Tribunal could not have exceeded the jurisdiction of the M