K.S. Jhaveri, J.

1. Admit. With the consent of learned Advocates for both the sides, matter is taken up for hearing today.

The present appeal arises from the judgment and order dated 25.11.2014 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 12519 of 2010 wherein the writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge and the award passed by the Labour Court was confirmed. The Labour Court passed award reinstating the workman with full backwages vide award dated 1.7.2010.

The learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 25.11.2014 had directed as under:

"... Thus, the plain and simple reading of these observations cannot be considered as a license conferred upon the petitioner to discharge or terminate the employee without following minimum of the law in form of section 25-F and other provisions of I.D. Act. It is indeed unfortunate that the observations of this Court have been misconstrued or attempted to be breached, as if it was a permission to discharge the employee. The Court has in ah unequivocal terms recorded that the discharge or termination shall be made only after following the procedure of law. Therefore, the emphasis placed upon these observations on the part of the petitioner, is absolutely unjustified to canvass the submission that the employer was at liberty to discharge and justify it's termination.

19. The second submission made on behalf of the petitioner, that petitioner being back door entrant could not ordered reinstatement, is also required to be rejected, as the plain and simple reading of the order would clearly indicate that neither the petitioner raised an issue qua respondent-workman being an employee seeking any other relief. In absence of any appropriate pleadings, the employer could not have found fault with the order of reinstatement. The written statement, which is indeed a cryptic statement running into page and a half, bereft of any other material followed by no evidence worth the name, could not have inter alia persuade the Court to pass an order, than the order, which is impugned in this petition. The employer, in my opinion, did not did his duty to invite the concerned Court to pronounce upon the submissions, which have sought to be canvassed at the Bar in this petition. To say the least, when the petitioner has not bothered to justify it's stand in any manner and when the petitioner had failed miserably in establishing due compliance with the rule of law especially with the provisions of section 25-F of the I.D. Act, then all other pleadings would pale into insignificance and therefore, required to be ignored as not warranted and not supported by law.

20. Bearing the aforesaid observations in mind, if one looks at the decisions cited at Bar (1) State of Himachal Pradesh v. Suresh Kumar Verma and another 1996(72)FLR 804(SC), (2) State of U.P. and others v. Ajay Kumar 1997 (76) FLR 85 (SC), (3) Suo Motu v. State of Gujarat and others 2002 (1) CLR 730 (Guj.), (4) B. Satyanarayana and others v. Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam and others 1999 LIC 2428, it can well be said that these decisions are hardly of any avail to the petitioner, as to say the least, it was misconceived on account of counsel thinks these judgments are applicable to the facts of the present case. On plain and simple reading of these judgments, it transpires that these judgments are pertaining to the facts, which were essential in the realm of service jurisprudence and not in the jurisprudence of Labour, which flows in the jurisprudence of I.D. Act. As against this, the Supreme Court's decision cited at bar on behalf of the respondent-workman, in case of Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi (supra), contains elaborate discussion with regard to the relief to be granted when in a given facts, it is proved that there is a clear violation of section-25-F. The labour Court's decision, impugned in this petition, contains specific findings and also decision based upon the Supreme Court judgment that mere informing