2016 Supreme(Guj) 1248
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
S.G. Shah, J.
Subhashchandra I. Parmar – Appellant
Vs.
State of Gujarat and Ors. – Respondents
Special Criminal Application No. 3290 of 2011
Decided On : 15-07-2016
For the Appellant :Pratik B. Barot, Advocate.
For the Respondent: Manan Mehta, APP.
The central legal point established in the judgment is the requirement of prior permission for conversion of religion under the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act, 2003, and the necessity of proper investigation and sanction for prosecution.
Headnote:
Freedom of Religion - Conversion - Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act, 2003 - Sections 2[a][ii], 2[b], 3 - Rules 3[1], 5[1] - Indian Christian Marriage Act - [2[a][ii], 2[b], 3, 3[1], 5[1] of the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act, 2003] - The court discussed the provisions of the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act, 2003, particularly sections 2[a][ii], 2[b], and 3, along with Rules 3[1] and 5[1]. It emphasized the requirement of prior permission for conversion of religion and the definition of 'allurement' and 'convert' under the Act. The court also highlighted the necessity of sanction for prosecution and the role of the District Magistrate in such cases. The interpretation of these provisions influenced the court's decision to quash the complaint and proceedings against the petitioner.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, holding a license under the Indian Christian Marriage Act, issued a marriage certificate to a Hindu girl and a Christian man. The girl's father filed a complaint alleging illegal conversion under the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act, 2003.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the petitioner had no role in the conversion of religion and was not liable for the alleged offences. It emphasized the lack of proper investigation and sanction for prosecution, leading to the quashing of the complaint and proceedings against the petitioner.
Issues: The issues revolved around the alleged illegal conversion of religion, the petitioner's role in the marriage and conversion, the requirement of prior permission for conversion, and the lack of proper investigation and sanction for prosecution.
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the lack of evidence implicating the petitioner in the conversion, the necessity of prior permission for conversion under the Act, and the absence of proper investigation and sanction for prosecution.
Final Decision: The petition was allowed, and the FIR, charge-sheet, and criminal proceedings against the petitioner were quashed and set aside.
S.G. Shah, J.
1. Rule. Service of rule is waived by Mr. Manan Mehta, Ld. APP and Mr. Hardik Dave, Ld. Advocate for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively.
2. Heard Learned advocates for the parties and perused the record.
3. Considering the fact that the matter is pending for admission since 2011, it has been taken up for final hearing with the consent of learned advocates for the parties, more particularly when interim relief is operating since last five years against further proceedings of criminal trial and thereby some proceedings are pending though the subject matter is quite clear, whereby the complaint certainly needs to be quashed at-least qua present petitioner if at all not for all the accused shown in the FIR.
4. The petitioner herein is holding license under Indian Christian Marriage Act, which authorizes him to solemnize and grant certificate of marriage. Pursuant to such license, it seems that the petitioner has issued a marriage certificate in favour of one Pinakin Divyakant Macwan and Vishruti, daughter of the complainant - Anilkumar Shukla when they claimed that they have got married. However, it seems that since Pinakin Macwan is a Christian, whereas Vishruti is a Hindu girl and her father Anilkumar Shukla respondent No. 2 herein has filed one FIR being C.R. No. II 109/2010 on 31/7/2010 before Nadiad West Police Station, alleging that his daughter Vishruti Anilkumar Shukla is illegally converted to be Christian and in doing so, Pinakin Macwan, so also present petitioner and mother of Vishruti, namely Kailasben, who is wife of the complainant, have helped Vishruti to renounce Hinduism and to become a Christian and, therefore, they have committed an offence under sections 2[a][ii], 2[b] and 3 of the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act, 2003 [for short 'the Act'], so also under rule 3[1] and 5[1] of the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Rules [for short 'the Rules']. It is, therefore, contended by the complainant in his complaint that all the four accused had managed to convert Vishruti on 10/2/2009 from being Hindu to Christian without getting prior permission of the District Magistrate i.e. Collector, as provided under the above Act and the Rules and hence they should be prosecuted and punished.
5. Based upon such complaint, the police has investigated the offence and filed charge-sheet being Charge-sheet No. I - 124/2010 on 4/10/2010 before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class at Nadiad. Therefore, the petitioner has challenged such FIR and charge-sheet praying to quash and set aside the same contending that--
"[1] The complaint is filed after more than 17 months.
[2] Present petitioner has simply registered the marriage on 10/2/2009 and that he has not to ascertain or verify that whether Vishruti has obtained prior permission of the District Magistrate for converting her religion.
[3] It is also alleged in the FIR that the petitioner has committed offence by performing marriage of Vishruti with Pinakin.
[4] Section 2[a][ii] of the Act, under which complaint and charge-sheet are filed, are simply providing definition of "allurement"; whereas section 2[b] defines the expression "convert" contending that allurement has no application to the fact of present case. Whereas the petitioner has not made any effort to convince Vishruti to renounce the Hindu religion and to adopt Christian religion in any manner whatsoever, but it was the act and decision of Vishruti only to renounce her religion and to become Christian and, therefore, none of the above expressions would be applicable in the present case, when there is no allegation regarding forceful conversion of religion in any manner whatsoever.
[5] The petitioner has not taken part in the marriage ceremony or in any act or ceremony regarding conversion and, therefore, in absence of any role of the petitioner either in conversion or in marriage of Vishruti, he is not involved in any of such activity and, therefore, he has not committed any offence as alleged.
[6] In fac