J.B. Pardiwala, J.

1. The respondent No. 2, although served with the notice of rule issued by this Court, yet has chosen not to remain present either in person or through an advocate and oppose this application.

2. By this application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the applicant-original accused seeks to invoke the inherent powers of this Court praying for quashing of the proceedings of the Criminal Case No. 48946 of 2015 pending in the court of the learned 4th Addl. Senior Civil Judge & Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat arising from a complaint filed under section 138 of the N.I. Act.

3. It appears from the materials on record that the cheque, which came to be dishonoured, was issued by the applicant herein in his capacity as one of the partners of the partnership firm running in the name of Shlok Enterprise. Indisputably, the partnership firm has not been arraigned as an accused in the complaint. In such circumstances, the applicant cannot be held vicariously liable under section 141 of the N.I. Act. The issue is squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours Pvt. Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661.

4. Section 141 of the Act is concerned with the offence by the company. It makes the other persons vicariously liable for the commission of an offence on the part of the company. Vicariously liability gets attracted when the condition precedent under section 141, namely, offence by the company stands satisfied. The issue whether a partnership firm is a legal entity within the meaning of section 141 of the N.I. Act is also no longer res integra after the pronouncement in the case of Oanali Ismailji Sadikot v. State of Gujarat & Anr., 2016 (3) GLR 1991. I may quote the relevant observations made by this Court as under;

"Before I proceed to answer the first question, let me look into the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel in that regard. In Munshi Ram (supra), the appellants before the Supreme Court were partners of a firm, Bharat Industries, Chheharta. By a Notification, 15th May, 1946, the Chheharta Municipal Committee levied a profession tax under Section 61(1)(b) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911. The appellants filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant committee from realizing the profession tax demanded by it. The appellants challenged the validity of the assessment contending that construed in light of the definition given in Section 2(40) of the Punjab General Clauses Act, the term person occurring in Section 6(1)(b) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, included a firm and since the trade carried on by the firm was one, the tax could be levied on the firm, and not on the partners individually. On such premises, it was pleaded that the Municipal Committee in levying the tax on the individual partners had exceeded its statutory powers under Section 61(1)(b) of the Municipal Act.

9.1 The trial Court dismissed the suit, on appeal by the plaintiffs, the Additional District Judge, Amritsar, reversed the judgment of the trial Court and decreed the suit. The Municipal Committee carried a further appeal to the High Court. The learned Single Judge, who heard the appeal, affirmed the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court. The matter reached upto the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in para 14 quoted Section 61(1)(b) of the Municipal Act material for the purpose of deciding the case which reads as under:

Subject to any general or special orders which the State Government may make in this behalf, and the rules, any committee may, from time to time for the purposes of this Act, and in the manner directed by this Act, impose in the whole or any part of the municipality any of the following taxes, namely:-

(1)(a)..............

(i) to (iii)..........

(b) a tax on persons practising any profession or art or carrying on any trade or calling in the municipality.

Explanation. - A person in the service or person holding an o