J.B. Pardiwala, J.

1. Rule returnable forthwith. Ms. Thakore, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor waives service of notice of rule for and on behalf of the respondent - State of Gujarat. Mr. Asim Pandya, the learned counsel waives service of notice of rule for and on behalf of the complainant.

2. By these two applications under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the applicant - original accused No. 3 seeks to invoke the inherent powers of this Court, praying for quashing of the proceedings of the Criminal Cases Nos. 1076 of 2015 and 1075 of 2015 respectively pending in the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dhanera, District: Banaskantha. Both the criminal cases are relating to dishonour of cheques punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

3. The applicant herein has been arraigned as an accused in his capacity as one of the partners of the partnership firm namely, Mangalam Oil Industries. Indisputably, the applicant has not signed the cheques on behalf of the firm. The cheques in question were signed by the original accused No. 1 in his capacity as a partner for and on behalf of the partnership firm.

4. Both the cheques came to be dishonoured on the date when they were presented, as the validity period of the cheques had expired.

5. The only question that falls for my consideration is whether the applicant herein can be prosecuted for the offence alleged by virtue of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

6. Indisputably, Mangalam Oil Industries i.e. the partnership firm, being a legal entity, has not been arraigned as an accused. In such circumstances, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Aneeta Hada v. M/s. Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd. [AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 1849] would come into play. However, Mr. Pandya, the learned counsel appearing for the complainant has an argument to canvass. According to Mr. Pandya, the proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Aneeta Hada (supra) would apply only in the case of Directors of the company and not a partnership firm, as a partnership firm is not a legal entity for the purpose of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. According to Mr. Pandya, even in the absence of the partnership firm in the complaint, the partners can be proceeded for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.

7. This Court had an occasion to consider the question whether a partnership firm is a legal entity like a 'company' so far as the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act is concerned in the case of Oanali Ismailji Sadikot v. State of Gujarat [ (2016) 3 G.L.R. 1991]. I may quote the relevant observations:

"8. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the applicant and having considered the materials on record, the following questions fall for my consideration:

I. Whether a partnership firm is a legal entity like a company so far as the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is concerned?

II. Is the prosecution of the partners of a firm, by virtue of Section 141 of the Act, maintainable in the absence of the partnership firm being impleaded or arraigned as an accused?

III. When the complaint under Section 138 of the Act has the initial defect in its sustainability, can such defect be cured by amending the proceedings by virtue of an application under Section 319 of the Cr. P.C.?

• FIRST QUESTION:

9. Before I proceed to answer the first question, let me look into the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel in that regard. In Munshi Ram (supra), the appellants before the Supreme Court were partners of a firm, Bharat Industries, Chheharta. By a Notification, 15th May, 1946, the Chheharta Municipal Committee levied a profession tax under Section 61(1)(b) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911. The appellants filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant committee from realizing the profession tax demanded by it. Th