G.R UDHWANI, J.

Rule. These applications are made to recall the order dated 23.10.2015 passed in the captioned Criminal Revision Applications for modification. It is urged to exercise the discretion under section 427 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, (“Cr. P.C” for short) to direct the sentence imposed upon the applicant to run concurrently rather than consequently on the plea that the transaction out of which the offences were registered against the applicant was the same; that five cheques were issued for the same transaction which were dishonoured. A joint trial was made but separate judgements were passed. It is urged that even this court had passed a common judgement in all the five Criminal Revision Applications.

2. For the proposition that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the applicant-convict, reliance is placed upon Shyam Pal v. Dayawati Besoya 2016 (10) Scale 441.

3. Having considered the rival contentions, it is not in dispute that all the five cases have arisen out of the same transactions. Trial was common; though separate judgements were delivered. This court has also passed a common judgement in all the five cases.

4. The facts in so far as sentencing part is concerned, are almost similar to those in Shyam Pal (supra) with the only difference that therein loan was given to the accused there on two different dates. Therein also two cheques were issued which were dishonoured and the case was lodged under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Under the above circumstances, the Apex Court in paragraphs No. 12 to 15 observed thus:

(12) The law on the orientation of two sentences awarded to an offender following his conviction successively, to define the cumulative duration thereof is envisaged in Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “Code”) in following terms:

“427. Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence. - (1) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence:

Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under section 122 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sentence shall commence immediately.

(2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence.”

(13) Though this provision has fallen for scrutiny of this Court umpteen times, we can profitably refer to one of the recent pronouncements in V.K Bansal v. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 211 where it was held that though it is manifest from Section 427(1), that the Court has the power and discretion to issue a direction that a subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with the previous sentences, the very nature of the power so conferred, predicates that the discretion, would have to be exercised along judicial lines or not in a mechanical or pedantic manner. It was underlined that there is no cut and dried formula for the Court to follow, in the exercise of such power and that the justifiability or otherwise of the same, would depend on the nature of the offence or offences committed and the attendant facts and circumstances. It was however postulated, that the legal position favours the exercise of the discretion to the benefit of the prisoners in cases where the prosecution is based on a single transaction, no matter even if different complaints in relation thereto might have been filed. The caveat as well was that such