Important Point:
(i) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the Court.
(ii) The Court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination.
(iii) Where the Court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration.
(iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.
(v) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity such as the deceased was unconscious and could never make any statement cannot form the basis of conviction.
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected.
(viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded.
(ix) When the eye-witness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail.
(x) If after careful scrutiny, the Court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration."
(xi) If the dying declaration is consistent, trustworthy and untutored, conviction can be maintained solely on its basis, without any further corroboration.

Abhilasha Kumari, J.

1. This appeal under Section-374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 12.10.2010, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Second Fast Track Court, Nadiad, in Sessions Case No. 78/2010, whereby the appellant-accused has been convicted of the offence under Section-302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced to imprisonment for life.

2. The case of the prosecution, based upon the complaint dated 06.03.2010 (Exhibit-46), given by Lalitaben, wife of Kiritsinh Udesinh Rajparmar, aged 32 years, who would hereinafter be referred to as "the deceased", is as follows.

2.1 The deceased was residing with her husband Kiritsinh Udesinh Rajparmar (hereinafter referred to as "the accused"), and children. Her husband was an agricultural labourer. The deceased had been married for a span of twelve years. The deceased was also doing the work of an agricultural labour and on 05.03.2010, she had gone for the said purpose. After returning home, she started cooking the evening meal. While she was cooking, the accused came and asked angrily why the meal was not ready. Thereafter, he started abusing her. The deceased has stated that the accused used to habitually consume liquor. While the deceased was cooking "Rotla" (Chapati) on the "Chula" (log stove), the accused took out a burning log from the stove and said that he would burn the deceased alive. Thereafter, he took a "Khadia" (kerosene lamp) and poured kerosene from it upon the deceased and set her ablaze with the burning log. The clothes of the deceased caught fire and she was badly burnt on her face, chest, back and hands. The mother-in-law of the deceased extinguished the fire by wrapping her in a quilt. The deceased was shifted to Nadiad Civil Hospital, from where she was referred to the Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad.

2.2 It is categorically stated in the complaint by the deceased that she is fully conscious. She has further stated that the accused often quarrelled with her and beat her up for household work and used to say that he would kill her.

3. The FIR was initially registered for the offence under Section-307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. However, after the death of the deceased on 12.03.2010, a charge-sheet was submitted for the offences under Sections-307 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code. As the offence with which the accused was charged was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Second Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nadiad, committed the case to the Sessions Court, Kheda. The charge was framed at Exhibit-7. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The prosecution examined as many as seventeen witnesses and relied upon seventeen documents in order to bring home the charge against the accused. The accused did not examine any witness or produce any documentary evidence. After considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, the Sessions Court arrived at the conclusion that there is sufficient material on record to prove the charge against the accused. It, therefore, convicted the accused and sentenced him to life imprisonment, relying mainly upon the dying declaration of the deceased.

4. In defence of the accused, Mr. P.H. Buch, learned counsel for the appellant has made the following submissions before this Court:

"(a) There is no eye-witness of the incident though it is the case of the prosecution that all family members were staying in a joint family.

(b) There is no independent witness. The prosecution has examined near relatives of the accused and deceased, but none of them have supported the case of the prosecution.

(c) It is not the case of the prosecution that the accused had been inflicting mental and physical cruelty upon the deceased earlier. No complaint has been filed in this regard even before the incident.

(d) The only piece of evidence on which the prosecution has relied is the dying declaration of the deceased, which is a weak piec